GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-j8f7-rjxc-mr56 filelock: ReadWriteLock follows a symlink at the lock path into SQLite
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-112936
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- filelock
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
- Weaknesses
- CWE-59, CWE-668
- Reviewed
- 2026-10-28
Affected packages
• PyPI filelock: >= 3.20.4, < 4.0.9 → fixed in 4.0.9
Description
Summary
`ReadWriteLock` and `AsyncReadWriteLock` resolve the lock path with `pathlib.Path.resolve()` and pass it to `sqlite3.connect()` without refusing a symlink. A local user who can create names in the lock's directory, such as `/tmp` or a shared cache, can plant a symlink at the lock path and make the victim's process create, lock, or write the file it points to, or break mutual exclusion between the victim's own processes.
Details
`ReadWriteLock.__init__` stores `pathlib.Path(lock_file).resolve()`, which follows a final symlink, and every connection opens that path through `sqlite3.connect()` with no `O_NOFOLLOW` or regular-file check. SQLite's own VFS also resolves the final symlink in user space, so `fs.protected_symlinks` and the sticky bit do not help: the kernel never sees a symlink to refuse. The other lock classes do not follow a final symlink: `FileLock` opens with `O_NOFOLLOW`, and `SoftReadWriteLock` coordinates through `.rw/`.
Proof of concept
On Linux, with the victim and attacker as different users and `/shared` mode 1777 with `fs.protected_symlinks=1`:
1. The attacker runs `ln -s /home/victim/private/pwned.flag /shared/app.rwlock.db`.
2. The victim constructs `ReadWriteLock("/shared/app.rwlock.db")`. A plain `os.open(..., O_NOFOLLOW)` on the same path fails, but the lock creates `/home/victim/private/pwned.flag`, owned by the victim, inside a directory the attacker cannot write.
3. With `/shared/cache.rwlock.db -> /shared/a.db`, one victim process holds the write lock. The attacker repoints the link to `/shared/b.db`, and a second victim process acquires the write lock while the first still holds it.
The same behavior reproduces on macOS, on Windows 11, and through `AsyncReadWriteLock`.
Impact
A local attacker with write access to the lock directory can make the victim create empty files it owns at paths the attacker cannot write, make the victim hold a SQLite lock on another application's database so that application gets `database is locked`, and give two victim processes the write lock at once, letting them corrupt the resource the lock protects.
Workarounds
Keep `ReadWriteLock` paths in directories that only trusted users can write.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-112936 filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock/security/advisories/GHSA-j8f7-rjxc-mr56 web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112936 advisory
- https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock/commit/4d45e83caf7e31f9a12fb44526bdc07f70114f04 web
- https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock package
- https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock/releases/tag/4.0.9 web