GHSA-jfjg-vc52-wqvf BentoML has Dockerfile Command Injection via system_packages in bentofile.yaml

• PyPI bentoml: < 1.4.37 → fixed in 1.4.37

Summary The `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`. Affected Component • `src/_bentoml_sdk/images.py:85-89` — `.format(packages=" ".join(packages))` into shell command • `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/templates/base_debian.j2:13` — `{{ __options__system_packages | join(' ') }}` • `src/bentoml/_internal/bento/build_config.py:174` — No validation on `system_packages` • All distro install commands in `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/__init__.py` Affected Versions All versions supporting `docker.system_packages` in `bentofile.yaml`, confirmed on 1.4.36. Steps to Reproduce 1. Create a project directory with: service.py: ```python import bentoml @bentoml.service class MyService: @bentoml.api def predict(self) -> str: return "hello" ``` bentofile.yaml: ```yaml service: "service:MyService" docker: system_packages: • "curl && id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned #" ``` 2. Run: ```bash bentoml build ``` 3. Examine the generated Dockerfile at `~/bentoml/bentos/my_service//env/docker/Dockerfile`. Line 41 will contain: ```dockerfile RUN apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef curl && id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned # ``` 4. Running `bentoml containerize my_service:` will execute `id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned` as root during the Docker build. Root Cause The `system_packages` field values are treated as package names (data) by the user but are string-formatted directly into shell commands in the Dockerfile: ```python images.py:85-89 self.commands.append( CONTAINER_METADATA[self.distro]["install_command"].format( packages=" ".join(packages) # No escaping ) ) ``` Where `install_command` is `"apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef {packages}"`. A `bash_quote` filter (wrapping `shlex.quote`) exists in the codebase and is registered in both Jinja2 environments, but it is only applied to environment variable values, never to `system_packages`. Impact 1. Malicious repositories: An attacker publishes an ML project with a crafted `bentofile.yaml`. Anyone who clones and builds it gets arbitrary code execution during `docker build`. 2. CI/CD compromise: Automated pipelines running `bentoml containerize` on PRs that modify `bentofile.yaml` are vulnerable. 3. BentoCloud: If BentoCloud builds images from user-supplied `bentofile.yaml`, this could achieve RCE on cloud infrastructure. 4. Supply chain: Shared bentos or model repos in the BentoML ecosystem can contain malicious configs. Suggested Fix Option 1: Input validation (recommended) Add a regex validator to `system_packages` in `build_config.py`: ```python import re VALID_PACKAGE_NAME = re.compile(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+\-_:]*$') def _validate_system_packages(instance, attribute, value): if value is None: return for pkg in value: if not VALID_PACKAGE_NAME.match(pkg): raise BentoMLException( f"Invalid system package name: {pkg!r}. " "Package names may only contain alphanumeric characters, " "dots, plus signs, hyphens, underscores, and colons." ) system_packages: t.Optional[t.List[str]] = attr.field( default=None, validator=_validate_system_packages ) ``` Option 2: Output escaping Apply `shlex.quote()` to each package name before interpolation in `images.py:system_packages()` and apply the `bash_quote` Jinja2 filter in `base_debian.j2`.