GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Packagist
GHSA-jhh7-832h-f8hv WPGraphQL has deprecated `user` field on SendPasswordResetEmailPayload that leaks user existence + profile (defeats explicit anti-enumeration design)
MEDIUM
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- Aliases
- CVE-2026-54768
- Ecosystem
- Packagist
- Packages
- wp-graphql/wp-graphql
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-204
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-31
Affected packages
• Packagist wp-graphql/wp-graphql: <= 2.6.0 (no fix yet)
Description
Summary
The `sendPasswordResetEmail` mutation in WPGraphQL is explicitly designed to prevent user enumeration. The resolver in `src/Mutation/SendPasswordResetEmail.php` states in a code comment:
`// We obsfucate the actual success of this mutation to prevent user enumeration.`
The mutation always returns `success: true` regardless of whether the supplied username/email belongs to an existing user. The intended public output field is only `success: Boolean`.
However, a deprecated `user` field is still registered on the `SendPasswordResetEmailPayload` output type in `src/Deprecated.php` (lines 433-450). This deprecated field resolves to a full `User` object when the supplied username/email corresponds to an existing author-class user, and `null` otherwise — completely undermining the anti-enumeration design.
The `@todo remove in 3.0.0` comment acknowledges the field is scheduled for removal, but it remains active in all 2.x releases, including current 2.14.1.
Discovered via source code review on May 29, 2026.
Details
The mutation resolver in `src/Mutation/SendPasswordResetEmail.php`:
```php
$payload = ['success' => true, 'id' => null];
$user_data = self::get_user_data($input['username']);
if (!$user_data) {
graphql_debug(...);
return $payload; // id stays null
}
// ...send email, then...
return ['id' => $user_data->ID, 'success' => true];
```
The intended public output field is only `success`. The `id` is internal-only state for downstream resolvers.
`src/Deprecated.php` registers an additional `user` field on the same payload type:
```php
register_graphql_field(
'SendPasswordResetEmailPayload',
'user',
[
'type' => 'User',
'deprecationReason' => static function () { return __('This field will be removed...'); },
'resolve' => static function ($payload, $args, AppContext $context) {
return !empty($payload['id'])
? $context->get_loader('user')->load_deferred($payload['id'])
: null;
},
],
);
```
This field reads the internal `$payload['id']` and resolves it through the standard user loader. The User Model's `allowed_restricted_fields` policy permits unauthenticated reads of public author fields (`databaseId`, `name`, `firstName`, `lastName`, `slug`, `description`, `uri`, `url`).
PoC
```graphql
mutation EnumerateUser {
sendPasswordResetEmail(input: { username: "[email protected]" }) {
success
user {
databaseId
name
firstName
lastName
slug
description
uri
}
}
}
```
Behavior:
• Non-existing user/email → `data.sendPasswordResetEmail.user` is `null`
• - Existing author-class user → `data.sendPasswordResetEmail.user` is a full User object with the listed fields populated
• - `success` always returns `true`, preserving the appearance of obfuscation — the deprecated `user` field is the leak
Impact
1. Username/email enumeration: unauthenticated attacker can verify whether any username or email is registered, with no WPGraphQL-side rate limiting
2. 2. Profile disclosure for author-class users: for any user with published posts (including editors and administrators), the attacker obtains `databaseId`, `name`, `firstName`, `lastName`, `slug`, `description` (user bio), `uri` — substantially more than mere existence
3. 3. Bypasses partial hardening: sites that disabled the REST API user endpoint, the user XML sitemap, and `?author=N` author redirects may still be vulnerable through this WPGraphQL path
4. 4. Spearphishing setup: firstName/lastName/description for authors provides personalized phishing material
Recommended fix
Either remove the deprecated `user` field entirely (advance the existing `@todo remove in 3.0.0`) or change the resolver to always return `null`:
```diff
'resolve' => static function ($payload, $args, AppContext $context) {
• return !empty($payload['id']) ? $context->get_loader('user')->load_deferred($payload['id']) : null;
• + // Always null — this deprecated field previously leaked user existence,
• + // undermining the anti-enumeration design of the sendPasswordResetEmail mutation.
• + return null;
• },
• ```
Defense in depth — change the mutation resolver itself to not populate `$payload['id']` on real success:
```diff
return [
• 'id' => $user_data->ID,
• + 'id' => null,
• 'success' => true,
• ];
• ```
Luke Granto — independent security researcher operating in good faith. Discovery via source code review of wp-graphql/wp-graphql v2.14.1, approximately 15 minutes from `git clone` to confirmed bug. No live exploitation against any third-party deployment.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-54768 WPGraphQL provides a GraphQL API for WordPress sites. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-204 Observable Response Discrepancy weakness