GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go
GHSA-jm28-2wcr-qf3h OliveTin: StartActionAndWait Endpoints Bypass `logs` Permission and Return Action Output
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-67439
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Packages
- github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-863
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-30
Affected packages
• Go github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin: < 0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885 → fixed in 0.0.0-20260708085316-e421780c9885
Description
Summary
The synchronous execution RPCs `StartActionAndWait` and `StartActionByGetAndWait` return the full `LogEntry` for the just-executed action without checking whether the caller is allowed to read that action's logs.
OliveTin's ACL model separates `exec` from `logs`. A deployment can intentionally allow a user to run an action while denying access to its historical or live output. That separation is enforced in `GetLogs`, `GetActionLogs`, `ExecutionStatus`, and `EventStream`, but it is not enforced in the synchronous `...AndWait` endpoints.
As a result, any user who can execute an action through these endpoints can read the action output immediately even when the action's ACL explicitly sets `logs:false`.
Details
OliveTin defines separate per-action permissions:
```go
// service/internal/config/config.go
type PermissionsList struct {
View bool `koanf:"view"`
Exec bool `koanf:"exec"`
Logs bool `koanf:"logs"`
Kill bool `koanf:"kill"`
}
```
The normal log and streaming paths correctly enforce `logs` permission:
```go
// service/internal/api/api.go
func (api *oliveTinAPI) isLogEntryAllowed(e *executor.InternalLogEntry, user *authpublic.AuthenticatedUser) bool {
if user == nil || !isValidLogEntry(e) {
return false
}
return acl.IsAllowedLogs(api.cfg, user, e.Binding.Action)
}
```
That check is used by:
• `GetLogs`
• `GetActionLogs`
• `ExecutionStatus`
• `EventStream`
However, the synchronous execution endpoints directly return the created `LogEntry` without any `logs` ACL check:
```go
// service/internal/api/api.go
func (api *oliveTinAPI) StartActionAndWait(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionAndWaitRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.StartActionAndWaitResponse], error) {
...
internalLogEntry, ok := api.startActionAndWaitRun(binding, args, user)
if !ok {
return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("execution not found"))
}
return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.StartActionAndWaitResponse{
LogEntry: api.internalLogEntryToPb(internalLogEntry, user),
}), nil
}
func (api *oliveTinAPI) StartActionByGetAndWait(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionByGetAndWaitRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.StartActionByGetAndWaitResponse], error) {
...
internalLogEntry, ok := api.executor.GetLog(execReq.TrackingID)
if ok {
return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.StartActionByGetAndWaitResponse{
LogEntry: api.internalLogEntryToPb(internalLogEntry, user),
}), nil
}
return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("execution not found"))
}
```
And `internalLogEntryToPb()` includes the full output:
```go
// service/internal/api/api.go
func (api *oliveTinAPI) internalLogEntryToPb(logEntry *executor.InternalLogEntry, authenticatedUser *authpublic.AuthenticatedUser) *apiv1.LogEntry {
pble := &apiv1.LogEntry{
ActionTitle: logEntry.ActionTitle,
Output: logEntry.Output,
ExitCode: logEntry.ExitCode,
ExecutionTrackingId: logEntry.ExecutionTrackingID,
...
}
...
return pble
}
```
The executor separately enforces `exec` permission, but there is no subsequent check that the response should omit or deny `Output` when `logs:false`.
Local Reproduction
I verified this locally with a one-off test against the real `StartActionAndWait` handler.
Configuration used:
• action `secret_action` with shell `echo SECRET_FROM_ACTION`
• user `low` matched by ACL:
• `exec: true`
• `logs: false`
• `view: false`
• `kill: false`
Then I invoked `StartActionAndWait` as `low` through the real handler path using header-based auth.
Observed output from the test run:
```text
=== RUN TestTempStartActionAndWaitLeaksOutputWithoutLogsPermission
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action requested" actionTitle=secret-action tags="[]"
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action parse args - Before" actionTitle=secret-action cmd="echo SECRET_FROM_ACTION"
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action parse args - After" actionTitle=secret-action cmd="echo SECRET_FROM_ACTION"
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action started" actionTitle=secret-action timeout=5
time="2026-03-12T23:36:33+01:00" level=info msg="Action finished" actionTitle=secret-action exit=0 outputLength=40 timedOut=false
temp_acl_bypass_test.go:56: output="S\x00E\x00C\x00R\x00E\x00T\x00_\x00F\x00R\x00O\x00M\x00_\x00A\x00C\x00T\x00I\x00O\x00N\x00\r\x00\n\x00" blocked=false action="secret-action"
--- PASS: TestTempStartActionAndWaitLeaksOutputWithoutLogsPermission (0.03s)
```
The UTF-16LE formatting is from Windows `echo`, but the key result is that the response returned the real command output even though the caller's ACL explicitly denied log access.
Impact
• Bypass of log confidentiality controls: Operators may configure actions to be executable but not log-readable. The `...AndWait` endpoints break that separation.
• Disclosure of secrets printed by actions: Many OliveTin actions wrap administrative scripts and commands whose stdout/stderr may contain credentials, internal paths, hostnames, tokens, or sensitive operational data.
• Adjacent to previous output-leak bugs: OliveTin already had an EventStream output disclosure bug. This is a separate response-path authorization gap on the synchronous execution APIs.
Recommended Fix
Enforce `logs` permission before returning `LogEntry` content from synchronous execution endpoints.
Two reasonable fixes:
1. Deny the endpoint response when `logs:false`
```go
if !acl.IsAllowedLogs(api.cfg, user, binding.Action) {
return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodePermissionDenied, fmt.Errorf("permission denied to view action output"))
}
```
2. Or redact log-bearing fields when `logs:false`
```go
pb := api.internalLogEntryToPb(internalLogEntry, user)
if !acl.IsAllowedLogs(api.cfg, user, binding.Action) {
pb.Output = ""
pb.ExitCode = 0
}
return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.StartActionAndWaitResponse{LogEntry: pb}), nil
```
The same fix should be applied to both:
• `StartActionAndWait`
• `StartActionByGetAndWait`
References
• `service/internal/api/api.go`
• `service/internal/config/config.go`
• `service/internal/acl/acl.go`
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-67439 OliveTin gives safe and simple access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization weakness
References
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-jm28-2wcr-qf3h web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67439 advisory
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/e421780c9885aa5024d2f47b4ed4898f2f18eb90 web
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin package
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.17.0 web