GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55 Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion

• Packagist getgrav/grav: < 2.0.16 → fixed in 2.0.16

Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion Summary A path traversal vulnerability in `MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile()` allows an authenticated user with media management permissions to delete arbitrary files on the server. The method validates only the basename portion of the filename using `Utils::checkFilename()`, while the directory path (which may contain `../` sequences) is preserved and passed unvalidated to `unlink()`. This enables directory escape from the intended media storage path. Severity High (8.1) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H CWE CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Details In `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php`, the `deleteFile()` method (lines 332-365) performs filename validation only on the basename, not the full path: ```php public function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void { $settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings); $filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false); // Line 339-340: Only the BASENAME is validated $basename = $filesystem->basename($filename); // e.g. "evil.jpg" from "../../evil.jpg" if (!Utils::checkFilename($basename)) { // passes - no traversal in basename throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */); } $path = $settings['destination'] ?? $this->getPath(); // ... // Line 353: Full pathname (with traversal) is preserved $pathname = $filesystem->pathname($filename); // "../../" // Line 356-357: Traversal path reconstructed [$base, $ext,,] = $this->getFileParts($basename); $name = "{$pathname}{$base}.{$ext}"; // "../../evil.jpg" // Line 360: Passed to doRemove() $this->doRemove($name, $path); } ``` `doRemove()` (line 521-582) then calls: ```php // Line 538 unlink("{$folder}/{$filename}"); // e.g. unlink("/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../config/system.yaml") ``` `Utils::checkFilename()` (lines 1022-1044) properly checks for `/`, `\`, and `..`, but it is applied to `$filesystem->basename($filename)` (the last path component only), so traversal sequences in the directory portion are never validated. Data flow from user input The vulnerability is reachable through the Flex media handling pipeline: 1. `FlexMediaTrait::setUpdatedMedia()` (line 386) iterates form flash data where `$filename` is the array key - user-controlled 2. For file deletions (`$file` is null, line 396), NO upload validation is performed (the `checkUploadedFile()` call at line 401 only executes when `$file` is truthy) 3. The raw filename is stored in `$this->_uploads` at line 414 4. `saveUpdatedMedia()` (line 499) calls `$media->deleteFile($filename, $settings)` with the unsanitized filename Sibling: renameFile() The same pattern exists in `renameFile()` (lines 374-405) which has even weaker validation - it performs NO `checkFilename()` call at all. While `renameFile()` currently has no callers in the core codebase, it is part of the public `MediaUploadInterface` and should be fixed as defense-in-depth. Proof of Concept Environment: Grav CMS 2.0.16 with admin plugin The attack requires an authenticated admin user with page/media editing permissions (not super-admin). 1. Create a target file: ```bash echo "DELETE_ME" > /var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt ``` 2. Submit a Flex object form (e.g. page edit) with a crafted media deletion where the filename key contains path traversal: ``` POST /admin/pages/mypage/task:save Content-Type: multipart/form-data The form flash data includes a media deletion entry with key: "../../data/target.txt" -> null (deletion marker) ``` 3. When `saveUpdatedMedia()` processes the deletion queue: • `$filename` = `../../data/target.txt` • `deleteFile("../../data/target.txt")` is called • `$basename` = `target.txt` (passes `checkFilename()`) • `$pathname` = `../../data/` • `$name` = `../../data/target.txt` • `doRemove()` calls `unlink("/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../data/target.txt")` • Which resolves to `unlink("/var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt")` 4. The file is deleted outside the intended media directory. Impact An authenticated user with media management permissions can: • Delete configuration files (`user/config/system.yaml`, `user/config/security.yaml`) • Delete other pages' content files • Delete authentication-related files (user account YAML files) • Cause denial of service by removing critical application files • Potentially escalate privileges by removing security configuration Suggested Fix Apply `Utils::checkFilename()` to the full `$filename` parameter before decomposing it, or reject any filename containing directory separators or `..` sequences: ```php public function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void { $settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings); $filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false); // Validate the FULL filename, not just the basename if (!Utils::checkFilename($filename)) { throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */); } // ... rest unchanged } ``` The same fix should be applied to `renameFile()` for both `$from` and `$to` parameters. References • Vulnerable file: `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php` lines 332-365, 521-582 • Caller: `system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/Traits/FlexMediaTrait.php` lines 386-414, 490-499 • Sibling: `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php` lines 374-405 (renameFile) • Related GHSA: GHSA-g6j3-8jv9-ch5f (path traversal in PagesController::batchCopy - different file, same bug class) Disclosure This vulnerability was discovered using AI-assisted security research tools.