GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Hex
GHSA-jq4m-q6p2-8gwc Hackney: Per-chunk timeout with unbounded body accumulation enables slow-drip OOM
HIGH
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- Aliases
- CVE-2026-47077
- Ecosystem
- Hex
- Packages
- hackney
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-295, CWE-400
- Reviewed
- 2026-06-26
Affected packages
• Hex hackney: >= 2.0.0, < 4.0.1 → fixed in 4.0.1
Description
Summary
`hackney_h3:await_response_loop/6` in `src/hackney_h3.erl` accumulates the HTTP/3 response body in memory without any size cap. The `after Timeout` clause is a per-message inactivity timer, not a wall-clock deadline: every received `stream_data` chunk, housekeeping `select` message, or `settings` frame resets it. A malicious HTTP/3 server that drips one small chunk every `Timeout - 1` ms with `Fin = false` and never terminates the stream keeps the loop alive indefinitely while the accumulation buffer grows without bound, eventually exhausting the BEAM process heap.
Details
In `src/hackney_h3.erl`, `await_response_loop/6` (line 430) builds the body with:
```erlang
NewBody = >
```
There is no `max_body` check and no monotonic deadline. The `after Timeout` clause at line 463 is restarted on each loop iteration. A server that ensures at least one message arrives within `Timeout` ms indefinitely (one small chunk per interval is sufficient) prevents the timeout from firing while `AccBody` grows linearly. The same module's `wait_connected/3` (lines 388-389) shows the correct pattern: track an absolute start time and pass a shrinking `Remaining` budget into each `receive`. This loop does not.
Configurations
Only the HTTP/3 transport is affected. Applications using the default TCP/TLS hackney transport are not vulnerable. The vulnerability requires using `hackney_h3` directly or passing `{transport, h3}` to `hackney:request/5`.
PoC
1. Stand up an HTTP/3 server that responds with `200 OK` headers (`Fin = false`), then emits a small `stream_data` chunk every `Timeout - margin` ms with `Fin = false` indefinitely.
2. Issue `hackney:request(get, Url, [], >, [{transport, h3}])` against it.
3. Watch the client process heap grow monotonically. The configured timeout never fires; the process is eventually killed by `max_heap_size` or the OS OOM killer.
Impact
Remote denial of service via unbounded memory consumption. Affects hackney 2.0.0 through 4.0.0 when using the HTTP/3 transport against an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced server. Each affected request consumes unbounded memory until the BEAM is killed. CVSS v4.0: 8.2 (HIGH).
Resources
• Introduction commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/0334af206d5099fdf510ed9eda18e34396f065ad
• Patch commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/3d25f9fea26c90609de9d64366fedfe5065413bc
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-47077 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows Flooding. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/security/advisories/GHSA-jq4m-q6p2-8gwc web
- https://github.com/ex-aws/ex_aws_sns/security/advisories/GHSA-8jgf-23q5-x7xx web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47077 advisory
- https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/3d25f9fea26c90609de9d64366fedfe5065413bc web
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-47077.html web
- https://github.com/benoitc/hackney package
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-47077 web