GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Packagist
GHSA-m492-gv72-xvxj Kimai Password Reset Link Remains Valid After Password Change
LOW
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- Packagist
- Packages
- kimai/kimai
- Severity
- Low
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
- Weaknesses
- CWE-640
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-01
Affected packages
• Packagist kimai/kimai: < 2.58.0 → fixed in 2.58.0
Description
Summary
The LoginLink signature used for password reset URLs covers only the user's `id` — it does not include the password hash. After a user clicks a reset link and successfully changes their password, the same link remains valid for up to 2 additional uses within a 1-hour window. Anyone who intercepts or caches the original link can log in as the user even after the password has been changed.
Details
`config/packages/security.yaml:73-78` configures the login link:
```yaml
login_link:
check_route: link_login_check
signature_properties: ['id']
lifetime: 900
max_uses: 3
```
The HMAC signature covers only `id`, not `password`, `username`, or `email`. The effective lifetime for password reset links is extended to 3600 seconds by `PasswordResetController.php:106-119` via `getPasswordResetRetryLifetime()`.
After the first successful use (where the user sets a new password), the `__pw_reset__` session flag is cleared by `WizardController.php:105`. Subsequent uses of the same link bypass the forced-password-reset wizard and grant a normal authenticated session.
Symfony's `LoginLinkHandler::consumeLoginLink` decrements a per-link counter but allows up to 3 total uses. Re-issuing a new link does not invalidate the old one.
The same vulnerability affects `UserLoginLinkCommand.php:77`, which generates admin-on-demand login links with the same signature scheme.
PoC
Step 1 — Generate a password reset link:
```bash
docker exec bin/console kimai:user:login-link
```
Step 2 — Use the link to log in and change the password.
Step 3 — Open the same link in a different browser or incognito session.
The link logs the attacker in as a fully authenticated user, despite the password having been changed in Step 2.
Step 4 — The link works a third time (3 total uses within 1 hour).
Impact
A password reset link that leaks through any of the following channels remains a valid authentication credential even after the legitimate user has changed their password: corporate mail-relay scanners that pre-click links (Microsoft Defender ATP, Mimecast, Barracuda), shared inboxes, browser history sync across devices, HTTP referrer headers, or proxy/WAF logs. The user believes they have secured their account by setting a new password, but the leaked link still grants full access for up to 2 additional uses within the hour.
Solution
Login links now also use the `password` hash for generating the signature, which will immediately expire the link after the user changed the password.
Read for more information.
Related
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-640 Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password weakness