GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-m6rx-7pvw-2f73 OpenClaude: Sandbox Bypass via Early-Exit Logic Flaw Allows Path Traversal
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-35570
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- @gitlawb/openclaude
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-22, CWE-284
- Reviewed
- 2026-04-21
Affected packages
• npm @gitlawb/openclaude: < 0.5.1 → fixed in 0.5.1
Description
A logic flaw exists in `bashToolHasPermission()` inside `src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts`. When the sandbox auto-allow feature is active and no explicit deny rule is configured, the function returns an `allow` result immediately — before the path constraint filter (`checkPathConstraints`) is ever evaluated. This allows commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../../../../etc/passwd`) to bypass directory restrictions entirely.
Affected Component
• File: `src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts`
• Function: `bashToolHasPermission`
• Location: ~line 1445 (sandbox auto-allow block)
Vulnerable Code Flow
```
bashToolHasPermission()
│
├─ [~1445] Sandbox auto-allow block
│ └─ No deny rule found → return ALLOW ⚠️ Early exit
│
└─ [~1644] checkPathConstraints() ❌ Never reached
```
The sandbox block was designed to skip interactive permission prompts in sandboxed environments. However, it unintentionally also skips the path traversal filter, which is a separate and critical security control.
Impact
Any process or user operating in a sandboxed session with no explicit deny rules can:
• Read arbitrary files outside the sandbox boundary (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, `.env` files, SSH private keys)
• Write to arbitrary paths (subject to OS-level permissions)
• Fully defeat the filesystem isolation that the sandbox is intended to enforce
Steps to Reproduce
1. Enable sandbox mode: `SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() = true`
2. Enable auto-allow: `SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() = true`
3. Ensure no explicit deny rules are configured for the session
4. Submit a bash command with a path traversal payload:
```
cat ../../../../../etc/passwd
```
5. Observe that the command receives `behavior: allow` without triggering `checkPathConstraints`
Recommended Fix
The sandbox auto-allow block should never short-circuit the full permission pipeline. It may suppress interactive prompts, but path constraint validation must always execute.
Option 1 — Preferred: Continue pipeline on `allow`
Only return early for `deny` or `ask` behaviors. Let `allow` fall through to `checkPathConstraints`:
```typescript
if (
SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() &&
SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() &&
shouldUseSandbox(input)
) {
const sandboxAutoAllowResult = checkSandboxAutoAllow(
input,
appState.toolPermissionContext,
);
if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== 'allow') {
// Only block or prompt — never skip path checks on allow
return sandboxAutoAllowResult;
}
// If 'allow', continue to checkPathConstraints below
}
```
Option 2 — Defense in depth: Run path check before returning
Run `checkPathConstraints` explicitly inside the sandbox block before returning:
```typescript
if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
const pathCheck = checkPathConstraints(input, appState.toolPermissionContext);
if (pathCheck.behavior !== 'allow') {
return pathCheck; // Block traversal attempts even in sandbox
}
return sandboxAutoAllowResult;
}
```
Option 3 — Minimal change: Move sandbox block after path check
Reorder the function so `checkPathConstraints` always runs first, and the sandbox block only handles the prompt-suppression logic afterward.
---
Credit: Elvin Latifli (@Rickidevs )
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-35570 OpenClaude is an open-source coding-agent command line interface for cloud and local model providers. vulnerability