GitHub Advisoryadvisory · GitHub Actions
GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 tj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2023-51664
- Ecosystem
- GitHub Actions
- Packages
- tj-actions/changed-files
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-74, CWE-77
- Reviewed
- 2024-01-02
Affected packages
• GitHub Actions tj-actions/changed-files: < 41 → fixed in 41
Description
Summary
The `tj-actions/changed-files` workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
Details
The `changed-files` action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an `escape_json` input enabled by default, only escapes `"` for JSON values.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. For example on `push`.
Proof of Concept
1. Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example `$(whoami).txt` which is a valid filename.
2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the `List all changed files` step below.
```yaml
• name: List all changed files
run: |
for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
```
Example output:
```yaml
[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do
for file in $(whoami).txt; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
[endgroup]
runner.txt was changed
```
Impact
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
• A new `safe_output` input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.
• A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
```yaml
• name: List all changed files
env:
ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
run: |
for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
```
Resources
• Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input
• Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2023-51664 tj-actions/changed-files is a Github action to retrieve all files and directories. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51664 advisory
- https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/0102c07446a3cad972f4afcbd0ee4dbc4b6d2d1b web
- https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/716b1e13042866565e00e85fd4ec490e186c4a2f web
- https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/ff2f6e6b91913a7be42be1b5917330fe442f2ede web
- https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files package