GHSA-mp82-fmj6-f22v pyLoad has a Session Cookie Security Downgrade via Untrusted X-Forwarded-Proto Header Spoofing (Global State Race Condition)

• PyPI pyload-ng: < 0.5.0b3.dev98 → fixed in 0.5.0b3.dev98

Summary The `set_session_cookie_secure` `before_request` handler in `src/pyload/webui/app/__init__.py` reads the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header from any HTTP request without validating that the request originates from a trusted proxy, then mutates the global Flask configuration `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE` on every request. Because pyLoad uses the multi-threaded Cheroot WSGI server (`request_queue_size=512`), this creates a race condition where an attacker's request can influence the `Secure` flag on other users' session cookies — either downgrading cookie security behind a TLS proxy or causing a session denial-of-service on plain HTTP deployments. Details The vulnerable code is in `src/pyload/webui/app/__init__.py:75-84`: ```python Dynamically set SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE according to the value of X-Forwarded-Proto TODO: Add trusted proxy check @app.before_request def set_session_cookie_secure(): x_forwarded_proto = flask.request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Proto", "") is_secure = ( x_forwarded_proto.split(',')[0].strip() == "https" or app.config["PYLOAD_API"].get_config_value("webui", "use_ssl") ) flask.current_app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = is_secure ``` The root cause has two components: 1. No origin validation (CWE-346): The `X-Forwarded-Proto` header is read from any client request. This header is only trustworthy when set by a known reverse proxy. Without `ProxyFix` middleware or a trusted proxy allowlist, any client can spoof it. The code itself acknowledges this with the TODO on line 76. 2. Global state mutation in a multi-threaded server: `flask.current_app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE']` is application-wide shared state. When Thread A (attacker) writes `False` to this config, Thread B (victim) may read `False` when Flask's `save_session()` runs in the after_request phase, producing a `Set-Cookie` response without the `Secure` flag. The Cheroot WSGI server is configured with `request_queue_size=512` in `src/pyload/webui/webserver_thread.py:46`, confirming concurrent multi-threaded request processing. No `ProxyFix` or equivalent middleware is configured anywhere in the codebase (confirmed via codebase-wide search). PoC Attack Path 1 — Cookie Security Downgrade (behind TLS-terminating proxy, `use_ssl=False`): An attacker with direct access to the backend (e.g., in a containerized/Kubernetes deployment) sends concurrent requests to keep `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE` set to `False`: ```bash Attacker floods backend directly, bypassing TLS proxy for i in $(seq 1 200); do curl -s -H 'X-Forwarded-Proto: http' http://pyload-backend:8000/ & done Meanwhile, a legitimate user behind the TLS proxy receives a session cookie During the race window, their Set-Cookie header lacks the Secure flag The cookie is then vulnerable to interception over plain HTTP ``` Attack Path 2 — Session Denial of Service (default plain HTTP deployment): ```bash Attacker causes SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=True on a plain HTTP server for i in $(seq 1 200); do curl -s -H 'X-Forwarded-Proto: https' http://localhost:8000/ & done Concurrent legitimate users receive Set-Cookie with Secure flag Browser refuses to send Secure cookies over HTTP Users' sessions silently break — they appear logged out ``` The second attack path works against the default configuration (`use_ssl=False`) and requires no special network position. Impact • Session cookie exposure (Attack Path 1): When deployed behind a TLS-terminating proxy, an attacker can cause session cookies to be issued without the `Secure` flag. If the victim's browser subsequently makes an HTTP request (e.g., via a mixed-content link or downgrade attack), the session cookie is transmitted in cleartext, enabling session hijacking. • Session denial of service (Attack Path 2): On default plain HTTP deployments, an attacker can continuously set `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=True`, causing browsers to refuse sending session cookies back to the server. This silently breaks all concurrent users' sessions with no user-visible error message, only a redirect to login. • No authentication required: Both attack paths are fully unauthenticated — the `before_request` handler fires before any auth checks. Recommended Fix Replace the global config mutation with per-response cookie handling, and add proxy validation: ```python Option A: Set Secure flag per-response instead of mutating global config @app.after_request def set_session_cookie_secure(response): # Only trust X-Forwarded-Proto if ProxyFix is configured is_secure = app.config["PYLOAD_API"].get_config_value("webui", "use_ssl") if 'Set-Cookie' in response.headers: # Modify cookie flags per-response, not global config cookies = response.headers.getlist('Set-Cookie') response.headers.remove('Set-Cookie') for cookie in cookies: if is_secure and 'Secure' not in cookie: cookie += '; Secure' response.headers.add('Set-Cookie', cookie) return response Option B (preferred): Use Werkzeug's ProxyFix with explicit trust from werkzeug.middleware.proxy_fix import ProxyFix In App.__new__, before returning: if trusted_proxy_count: # from config app.wsgi_app = ProxyFix(app.wsgi_app, x_proto=trusted_proxy_count) Then set SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE once at startup based on use_ssl config, and let ProxyFix handle X-Forwarded-Proto transparently ``` At minimum, remove the `before_request` handler entirely and set `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE` once at startup (line 130 already does this in `_configure_session`). The dynamic per-request adjustment is the root cause of both the spoofing and the race condition.