GHSA-mrq8-rjmw-wpq3 Fiber has a Denial of Service Vulnerability via Route Parameter Overflow

• Go github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2: < 2.52.12 → fixed in 2.52.12 • Go github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3: < 3.1.0 → fixed in 3.1.0

A denial of service vulnerability exists in Fiber v2 and v3 that allows remote attackers to crash the application by sending requests to routes with more than 30 parameters. The vulnerability results from missing validation during route registration combined with an unbounded array write during request matching. Affected Versions • Fiber v3.0.0-rc.3 and earlier v3 releases • Fiber v2.52.10 and potentially all v2 releases (confirmed exploitable) • Both versions share the same vulnerable routing implementation Vulnerability Details Root Cause Both Fiber v2 and v3 define a fixed-size parameter array in `ctx.go`: ```go const maxParams = 30 type DefaultCtx struct { values [maxParams]string // Fixed 30-element array // ... } ``` The `router.go` `register()` function accepts routes without validating parameter count. When a request matches a route exceeding 30 parameters, the code in `path.go` performs an unbounded write: • v3: `path.go:514` • v2: `path.go:516` ```go // path.go:514 - NO BOUNDS CHECKING params[paramsIterator] = path[:i] ``` When `paramsIterator >= 30`, this triggers: ``` panic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30 ``` Attack Scenario 1. Application registers route with >30 parameters (e.g., via code or dynamic routing): ```go app.Get("/api/:p1/:p2/:p3/.../p35", handler) ``` 2. Attacker sends matching HTTP request: ```bash curl http://target/api/v1/v2/v3/.../v35 ``` 3. Server crashes during request processing with runtime panic Proof of Concept For Fiber v3 ```go package main import ( "fmt" "net/http" "time" "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3" ) func main() { app := fiber.New() // Register route with 35 parameters (exceeds maxParams=30) path := "/test" for i := 1; i 30 parameters Real-World Impact • Public APIs: Remote DoS attacks on vulnerable endpoints • Microservices: Cascade failures if vulnerable service is critical • Auto-scaling: Repeated crashes prevent proper recovery • Monitoring: Log flooding and alert fatigue Likelihood HIGH - Exploitation requires only: • Knowledge of route structure (often public in APIs) • Standard HTTP client (curl, browser, etc.) • Single malformed request Workarounds Until patched, users should: 1. Audit Routes: Ensure all routes have ≤30 parameters ```bash # Search for potential issues grep -r "/:.*/:.*/:.*" . | grep -v node_modules ``` 2. Disable Dynamic Routing: If programmatically registering routes, validate parameter count: ```go paramCount := strings.Count(route, ":") if paramCount > 30 { log.Fatal("Route exceeds maxParams") } ``` 3. Rate Limiting: Deploy aggressive rate limiting to mitigate DoS impact 4. Monitoring: Alert on panic patterns in application logs Timeline • 2024-12-24: Vulnerability discovered in v3 during PR #3962 review • 2024-12-25: Proof of concept confirmed exploitability in v3 • 2024-12-25: Vulnerability confirmed to also exist in v2 (same root cause) • 2024-12-25: Security advisory created References • v3 Related PR: https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962 (UpdateParam feature with defensive checks, doesn't fix root cause) • Vulnerable Code Locations: • v3: path.go:514 • v2: path.go:516 Credit Discovered by: @sixcolors (Fiber maintainer) and @TheAspectDev