GHSA-mvx4-532p-xfm9 Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation

• PyPI open-webui: >= 0.9.0, < 0.10.0 → fixed in 0.10.0

Title: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation Summary Open WebUI documents `pending` as a zero-access role used for new sign-ups and deactivated users, and normal HTTP routes enforce that with `get_verified_user()` (which rejects `pending`), while automation create/update/run routes additionally require the `features.automations` permission. Two paths missed that lifecycle gate, so a deactivated (`pending`) account could keep acting through the background automation scheduler: 1. Scheduler did not re-gate the owner. When a stored automation became due, `execute_automation()` rehydrated the owner with `Users.get_user_by_id(...)` and re-entered the chat completion pipeline without re-checking that the owner was still `user`/`admin` or still held `features.automations`. A still-active automation therefore kept running after its owner was deactivated. 2. Model ACL only enforced for exact role `user`. `check_model_access()` applied private-model grants only when `user.role == "user"`, so a `pending` principal fell through a branch that denies a normal non-owner `user`. Net effect: a deactivated account could continue scheduled chat generation through the background worker, consuming the operator's configured model-provider credentials and reaching a stored automation model ID that its current role/ACL state would no longer permit through normal routes. Impact A `pending`/deactivated account continues to execute due scheduled automations after its access has been revoked, consuming the operator's provider credentials, quota and shared capacity, and bypassing the private-model ACL for the automation's stored model ID. Exploitation requires a previously created active automation and a later transition to `pending` (deactivation or approval rollback), so it is bounded and not interactive. It does not grant unauthenticated access, account takeover, code execution, or cross-user data exfiltration. Patched In 0.10.0: • `execute_automation()` aborts and records an error unless the rehydrated owner is still `user` or `admin` and (for non-admins) still holds `features.automations`, so a deactivated or de-permissioned owner's due automation no longer runs. • `check_model_access()` enforces model ACLs for every non-admin role rather than only the exact role `user`, so a `pending` or otherwise unrecognised role no longer falls through. Credits @rexpository