GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-p4xf-rf54-rj3x pnpm: Git Fetch Argument Injection via Lockfile resolution.commit

MEDIUM Published 2026-06-26 Modified 2026-06-26 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-50014
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
pnpm
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-88
Reviewed
2026-06-26

Affected packages

• npm pnpm: < 10.34.0 → fixed in 10.34.0 • npm pnpm: >= 11.0.0, < 11.4.0 → fixed in 11.4.0

Description

Summary pnpm passes the lockfile-controlled git `resolution.commit` value to `git fetch` without a `--` separator or commit-format validation. For git dependencies fetched through the shallow-fetch path, a malicious lockfile can replace the expected 40-character commit hash with a Git option such as `--upload-pack=`. For SSH and local transports, `--upload-pack` can execute the supplied command. HTTPS transports ignore `--upload-pack`, so the practical attack surface is primarily SSH or local git dependencies. Vulnerability Details The vulnerable path is in `fetching/git-fetcher/src/index.ts`. When a git dependency host is configured for shallow fetching, pnpm calls: ```typescript await execGit(['fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', resolution.commit], { cwd: tempLocation }) ``` Because `resolution.commit` is appended before a `--` separator, Git can parse a commit value beginning with `-` as an option. The same file later passes the value to `git checkout` without a separator: ```typescript await execGit(['checkout', resolution.commit], { cwd: tempLocation }) ``` `resolution.commit` comes from the lockfile and is typed as a plain `string`; pnpm does not validate it as a 40-character hexadecimal commit before passing it to Git. Proof of Concept ```bash bash autofyn_audit/exploits/vuln11_git_upload_pack_rce/exploit.sh Creates a local bare git repo and triggers the shallow-fetch path. Replaces the lockfile commit hash with '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/vuln11_pwned'. Result: PASS -- /tmp/vuln11_pwned created by injected touch command. ``` The PoC uses a local `file://githost/...` repository because the injection requires a local or SSH transport. HTTPS transport ignores `--upload-pack`. Impact Code execution as the user running `pnpm install`, under specific transport conditions. The attacker must modify `pnpm-lock.yaml`, and the affected dependency must use SSH or local git transport. HTTPS transport (the common case) is immune. Suggested Remediation Add a `--` separator before lockfile-controlled git revision values. Validate `resolution.commit` matches `/^[0-9a-f]{40}$/i` before passing to Git. --- > Discovered by AutoFyn > Full audit report: audit_report.md > Exploit script: exploit.sh

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-88 Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command weakness

References