GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2 SpdyStream: DOS on CRI

• Go github.com/moby/spdystream: < 0.5.1 → fixed in 0.5.1

The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.   Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected: 1. SETTINGS entry count -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit `numSettings` from the payload and allocates a slice of that size without checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker can set `numSettings` to a value far exceeding the actual payload, triggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.   2. Header count -- `parseHeaderValueBlock` reads a 32-bit `numHeaders` from the decompressed header block and allocates an `http.Header` map of that size with no upper bound.   3. Header field size -- Individual header name and value lengths are read as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with no validation.   Because SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire payload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser interprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is enough to exhaust process memory. Impact  Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly or through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can send SPDY frames to the service can crash the process with a single crafted SPDY control frame, causing denial of service. Affected versions  `github.com/moby/spdystream` <= v0.5.0 Fix  v0.5.1 addresses the receive-side allocation bugs and adds related hardening:   Core fixes: • SETTINGS entry-count validation -- The SETTINGS frame reader now checks that `numSettings` is consistent with the declared frame length (`numSettings <= (length-4)/8`) before allocating. • Header count limit -- `parseHeaderValueBlock` enforces a maximum number of headers per frame (default: 1000). • Header field size limit -- Individual header name and value lengths are checked against a per-field size limit (default: 1 MiB) before allocation. • Connection closure on protocol error -- The connection read loop now closes the underlying `net.Conn` when it encounters an `InvalidControlFrame` error, preventing further exploitation on the same connection.   Additional hardening: • Write-side bounds checks -- All frame write methods now verify that payloads fit within the 24-bit length field, preventing the library from producing invalid frames.   Configurable limits: • Callers can adjust the defaults using `NewConnectionWithOptions` or the lower-level `spdy.NewFramerWithOptions` with functional options: `WithMaxControlFramePayloadSize`, `WithMaxHeaderFieldSize`, and `WithMaxHeaderCount`.