GHSA-pfvc-3p5h-x7h6 Wings exposes node configuration secrets through egg configuration-file templating

• Go github.com/pterodactyl/wings: < 1.12.3 → fixed in 1.12.3

Impact Type: Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials leading to privilege escalation and full node compromise. Wings exposes its entire daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file templating engine. When Wings renders a server's configuration files, any `{{config.}}` placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against the full marshalled daemon configuration, with no restriction on which paths may be read. Because the Panel substitutes user-controlled egg variable values into these replacements before sending them to Wings, a low-privileged user can smuggle a `{{config.*}}` placeholder through a variable value. The placeholder is then resolved by Wings and written into a file inside the user's own server, where it can be read via the file manager or SFTP. This allows reading, among other values: • `{{config.token}}` - the node's daemon token, which is both the API bearer for   the Panel⇆Wings channel and the HMAC signing key for every JWT the node   issues; • `{{config.token_id}}`; • `{{config.docker.registries}}` - configured container-registry credentials. Who is impacted: Any deployment where a user who is not fully trusted can set an egg variable value (e.g. a server owner or a subuser with the `startup.update` permission) and the server's egg renders a user-editable variable into a configuration file via `{{server.build.env.*}}`. This pattern is common across stock and community eggs, so most multi-tenant / shared-hosting deployments are affected. Resulting impact: Disclosure of the node daemon token lets the attacker forge authentication tokens and act against every server on that node, a full-node compromise reachable from a low-privileged account. Patches Yes. Fixed in Wings `v1.12.3` (Panel is unaffected; the fix is Wings-only). Wings no longer exposes its full configuration to the templating engine only an explicit, non-secret subset (the Docker network interface) can be resolved by `{{config.*}}` placeholders. Users should upgrade Wings to `v1.12.3` or later. After upgrading, rotate the affected nodes' daemon tokens, since a previously exfiltrated token remains valid until rotated (Admin → Nodes → Configuration → reset the token, then re-deploy `config.yml` to the node). Workarounds For operators who cannot upgrade immediately: • Audit your eggs and ensure no user-editable variable is rendered into a   configuration file, or mark such variables non-editable. These reduce exposure but are not a complete fix; upgrading Wings is the recommended action.