GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)

HIGH Published 2026-10-02 Modified 2026-10-02 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
trigger.dev
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-862
Reviewed
2026-10-02

Affected packages

• npm trigger.dev: < 4.5.2 → fixed in 4.5.2

Description

Summary The run replay `action` function at `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` has no authentication or authorization check. While the `loader` (GET) in the same file properly calls `requireUser(request)` and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the `action` (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's `friendlyId`. Details Vulnerable file: `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts` The `loader` (line 28-29) — properly authenticated: ```typescript export async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) { const user = await requireUser(request); // ✓ Auth check const userId = user.id; // ... queries scoped to user's orgs } ``` The `action` (line 166-193) — NO authentication: ```typescript export const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) => { const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params); // ✗ NO requireUser() call // ✗ NO requireUserId() call // ✗ NO org membership check const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({ where: { friendlyId: runParam, // Queries ANY run, no org scoping }, include: { runtimeEnvironment: { select: { slug: true } }, project: { include: { organization: true } }, }, }); // ... proceeds to replay the run in the victim's environment const replayRunService = new ReplayTaskRunService(); ``` The Prisma query at line 177 fetches the run by `friendlyId` only — no `userId` or organization filter. The `ReplayTaskRunService` then creates a new task run in the victim's environment, executing with the victim's environment variables and secrets. Same bug class exists in: `apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.batches.$batchId.check-completion.ts` (line 17) — the `action` has zero authentication, allowing any user to trigger batch completion for any batch ID. PoC Run replay IDOR: ```bash Any authenticated user can replay any org's task run POST /resources/taskruns/run_abc123def/replay Cookie: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded environmentId=&failedRedirect=/ ``` The `friendlyId` values (e.g., `run_abc123def`) are short, incrementing strings that can be enumerated. Batch completion (same bug class): ```bash Any authenticated user can trigger batch completion for any batch POST /resources/batches//check-completion Cookie: Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded redirectUrl=/ ``` Impact • Cross-organization task execution: An attacker can replay task runs belonging to other organizations, executing tasks in the victim's environment with the victim's secrets and API keys • Secret exposure: Replayed tasks run with the victim organization's environment variables, which may contain database credentials, API keys, and other secrets • Resource consumption: Attacker consumes the victim's compute quota by replaying their tasks • Data integrity: The batch completion endpoint can prematurely resume parent tasks waiting for batch results, causing data integrity issues • Low attack complexity: `friendlyId` values are short, predictable strings — enumeration is feasible

Related

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-862 Missing Authorization weakness

References