GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go

GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private

MEDIUM Published 2026-07-21 Modified 2026-07-21 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-58510
Ecosystem
Go
Packages
code.gitea.io/gitea
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-200, CWE-281, CWE-359
Reviewed
2026-07-21

Affected packages

• Go code.gitea.io/gitea: < 1.27.0 → fixed in 1.27.0

Description

Summary GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ("Gitea may send release notification emails for private repositories to users whose access has been revoked", fix in PR #36319 / commit 8a98ac22) added `repo_model.ClearRepoWatches` as a defense for the state transition public→private. The cleanup was wired into `services/repository/repository.go::MakeRepoPrivate` only. The sister helper `services/repository/repository.go::updateRepository` — which is the function used by the API path `PATCH /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}` — was not patched and still calls `ClearRepoStars` only. As a result, when a public repository is flipped to private via the REST API (rather than via the web Settings → Danger Zone UI), the watch records persist. Affected users can: • See the now-private repository in `GET /api/v1/user/subscriptions?private=true` along with its full `Repository` JSON (description, default branch, language, fork status, counts, mirror metadata, license list, etc.) — even though they have no access to the repository. • Have their stale watch records re-leak content through any future notification path that does not include the send-time `CheckRepoUnitUser` check that was added to `services/mailer/mail_release.go`. • Inflate the visible `NumWatches` counter on the repository. Severity Medium — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` Same impact class as the original GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp (which was classified Medium). The send-time mail filter added in the same PR mitigates the release-content disclosure vector. The residual leak is repo metadata via the subscriptions endpoint and stale watcher counts. CWE-281 (Improper Preservation of Permissions), CWE-359 (Exposure of Private Personal Information), CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information). Affected Versions Every release starting from v1.25.4 (the release shipping the original GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp fix) through HEAD (master @ `ef801bb6`, 2026-05-16). The follow-up refactor in commit `943ff752` (PR #36959, 2026-03-24) which merged `MakeRepoPublic`+`MakeRepoPrivate` did not propagate the `ClearRepoWatches` call to `updateRepository`. Affected Component • `services/repository/repository.go:240-302` — `func updateRepository(ctx, repo, visibilityChanged bool)`, the sister helper called via the API path. Clears stars on line 273 but never calls `ClearRepoWatches`. • `routers/api/v1/repo/repo.go::Edit` (line 573) → `updateBasicProperties` (line 678-697) → `repo_service.UpdateRepository(ctx, repo, visibilityChanged)` (line 726) — the API path that exercises the sister helper. Steps to Reproduce The bug is observable purely from static analysis; the live PoC is straightforward. 1. Start a Gitea instance at any release from v1.25.4 onwards (verified static at HEAD `ef801bb6`). 2. Create users `A` (org admin) and `B` (member). Create a public repository `A/proj`. As `B`, watch the repo: ``` curl -u B: -X PUT "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/A/proj/subscription" ``` 3. As `A`, flip the repo to private via the REST API (not via the web UI): ``` curl -u A: -X PATCH "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/A/proj" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"private": true}' ``` 4. As `B`, list `B`'s watched repos with `private=true`: ``` curl -u B: "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/user/subscriptions" ``` The now-private repo `A/proj` is returned in `B`'s subscription list, with the full `Repository` payload — including `description`, `default_branch`, `language`, `topics`, `license`, fork/branch/issue/release counts, etc. 5. Compare with the web-UI path (which IS patched). As `A`, flip a different public repo `A/proj2` to private via Settings → Danger Zone → "Make this repository private" (which calls `repo_service.MakeRepoPrivate`). Verify `B`'s subscription list no longer contains `A/proj2`. The asymmetry of outcomes between steps 4 and 5 — for the same state transition — is the gap. Direct Evidence (no PoC needed) ``` $ gh api repos/go-gitea/gitea/contents/services/repository/repository.go \ --jq .content | base64 -d | grep -n "ClearRepoWatches\|ClearRepoStars" 154: if err = repo_model.ClearRepoStars(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil { 157: if err = repo_model.ClearRepoWatches(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil { # MakeRepoPrivate 273: if err = repo_model.ClearRepoStars(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil { # updateRepository — ClearRepoWatches missing here ``` The fix-author's own test file confirms the asymmetry: ``` $ gh api repos/go-gitea/gitea/contents/services/repository/repository_test.go --jq .content | base64 -d | grep -n "Test.*VisibilityChanged\|Test.*ClearsWatches" 44:func TestUpdateRepositoryVisibilityChanged(t *testing.T) { # only checks act.IsPrivate 73:func TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches(t *testing.T) { # checks watches are cleared ``` `TestUpdateRepositoryVisibilityChanged` explicitly calls `updateRepository(ctx, repo, true)` (line 53) and asserts `act.IsPrivate` (line 61) — but never verifies `GetRepoWatchersIDs` returns empty, while the parallel `TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches` does. The test asymmetry mirrors the fix asymmetry. Impact • An organization that uses terraform-gitea or any other REST-API-driven automation to flip repositories private (the canonical IaC pattern) hits `updateRepository`, not `MakeRepoPrivate`. • An organization using the official Gitea SDK (`go-sdk`, `py-gitea`, etc.) or `curl` scripts to make repos private after an internal policy change hits the same path. • Multi-tenant Gitea-as-a-service operators with API-driven repository-lifecycle endpoints are exposed. Stale watch rows leak through `GET /user/subscriptions` (with the watcher's own credentials), `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/subscribers` (stale `NumWatches` total), and become a re-leak surface for any future notification path that forgets the send-time access check. Suggested Fix Drop-in mirror of the call already present in `MakeRepoPrivate`. In `services/repository/repository.go::updateRepository`, inside the existing `if repo.IsPrivate { ... }` branch (around line 265-276), add the `ClearRepoWatches` call directly after `ClearRepoStars`: ```go // services/repository/repository.go func updateRepository(ctx context.Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, visibilityChanged bool) (err error) { ... if visibilityChanged { ... // If repo has become private, we need to set its actions to private. if repo.IsPrivate { _, err = e.Where("repo_id = ?", repo.ID).Cols("is_private").Update(&activities_model.Action{ IsPrivate: true, }) if err != nil { return err } if err = repo_model.ClearRepoStars(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil { return err } // Match MakeRepoPrivate's behavior — see PR #36319 / GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp. // Stale watch rows on a now-private repo leak repository metadata to ex-watchers // via GET /user/subscriptions?private=true and through any future notification // path that does not have a send-time access check. if err = repo_model.ClearRepoWatches(ctx, repo.ID); err != nil { return err } } ... } ... } ``` Regression test (mirror of `TestMakeRepoPrivateClearsWatches`) to add to `services/repository/repository_test.go`: ```go func TestUpdateRepositoryClearsWatchesOnVisibilityChange(t *testing.T) { assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase()) repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 1}) assert.False(t, repo.IsPrivate) watchers, err := repo_model.GetRepoWatchersIDs(t.Context(), repo.ID) require.NoError(t, err) require.NotEmpty(t, watchers) repo.IsPrivate = true assert.NoError(t, updateReposit…

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-58510 GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (3)

  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor weakness
  • CWE-281 Improper Preservation of Permissions weakness
  • CWE-359 Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor weakness

References