GHSA-q4pp-j36h-3gqg Minimal `basti` IAM Policy Allows Shell Access

• npm basti-cdk: < 1.0.1 → fixed in 1.0.1

Summary The provided Minimal IAM Policy for `bastic connect` does not include `ssm:SessionDocumentAccessCheck`. This results in the ability to get a shell session on the bastion, not just the intended access for Port Forwarding. Details `basti connect` is designed to "securely connect to your RDS/Aurora/Elasticache/EC2 instances", using a bastion instance "with AWS Session Manager port forwarding capability to make the target available on your localhost." The Minimal IAM Policy allows port forwarding via the following statement: ``` { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "ssm:StartSession", "Resource": [ "arn:aws:ssm:*:*:document/AWS-StartPortForwardingSessionToRemoteHost", "arn:aws:ec2:::instance/" ] } ``` This statement does not include the following condition: ``` "Condition": { "BoolIfExists": { "ssm:SessionDocumentAccessCheck": "true" } } ``` As a result, the `basti connect` minimal policy is logically identical to: ``` { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "ssm:StartSession", "Resource": [ "arn:aws:ssm:*:*:document/AWS-StartPortForwardingSessionToRemoteHost", "arn:aws:ssm:*:*:document/SSM-SessionManagerRunShell", "arn:aws:ec2:::instance/" ] } ``` A `basti` admin would expect users under the minimal policy to be able to port forward. However, they could also get a shell on the bastion. For more details on this footgun, see: https://ramimac.me/ssm-iam PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ Impact Impact would depend on configuration/hardening of the bastion. I've seen examples where bastions have credentials to downstream systems in configuration or memory that would be exposed.