GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Packagist

GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logs

MEDIUM Published 2026-06-26 Modified 2026-06-26 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
Packagist
Packages
web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
Weaknesses
CWE-200, CWE-532
Reviewed
2026-06-26

Affected packages

• Packagist web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle: < 5.3.4 → fixed in 5.3.4

Description

Impact `Webauthn\Bundle\Security\Http\Authenticator\WebauthnAuthenticator` logs the full `Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request` object inside the log context of both `onAuthenticationSuccess()` and `onAuthenticationFailure()` at INFO level: ```php $this->logger->info('User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.', [ 'request' => $request, 'firewallName' => $firewallName, 'identifier' => $token->getUserIdentifier(), ]); $this->logger->info('Webauthn authentication request failed.', [ 'request' => $request, 'exception' => $exception, ]); ``` `Request::__toString()` returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for `LineFormatter`, `JsonFormatter` via `NormalizerFormatter`, etc.), sensitive headers such as `Cookie` (session identifier), `Authorization` and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text. Applications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions. Affected versions Every release prior to 5.3.4 is affected. Patches The fix removes the full `Request` object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below. Workarounds Until the upgrade is applied, projects can: 1. Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production. 2. Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the `request` key from the context of these records before they are written. Credit Reported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of Stepup-Webauthn.

Related

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor weakness
  • CWE-532 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File weakness

References