GitHub Advisoryadvisory · crates.io
GHSA-qv2r-v3mx-f4pf zebrad has full node denial of service via non-ASCII LongPollId in getblocktemplate
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-52731
- Ecosystem
- crates.io
- Packages
- zebra-rpc, zebrad
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-248
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-02
Affected packages
• crates.io zebra-rpc: < 8.0.0 → fixed in 8.0.0
• crates.io zebrad: < 4.5.0 → fixed in 4.5.0
Description
Am I affected
You are affected if:
1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.
2. Your `zebrad.toml` sets `rpc.listen_addr` to a TCP address (RPC server is enabled).
3. An attacker can authenticate to the RPC endpoint. With the default `enable_cookie_auth = true`, this requires the attacker to read the `.cookie` file. With `enable_cookie_auth = false`, any network client reaching the RPC port can trigger it.
Summary
The `getblocktemplate` RPC handler panics when parsing a `LongPollId` parameter that contains non-ASCII (multi-byte UTF-8) characters. The handler performs byte-index string slicing on the user-supplied string, which panics in Rust when a byte index falls within a multi-byte character boundary. Because Zebra's release profile sets `panic = "abort"`, the panic terminates the entire node process.
Details
The `getblocktemplate` handler receives a user-supplied `LongPollId` string and slices it at fixed byte offsets to extract the encoded tip hash and tip height. When the string contains multi-byte UTF-8 characters, a byte-index slice can land in the middle of a character, causing Rust's `str` indexing to panic with "byte index is not a char boundary."
Under the `panic = "abort"` release profile, this panic terminates the entire `zebrad` process rather than just the RPC task.
Patches
zebra-rpc 8.0.0 and zebrad 4.5.0.
Replace byte-index string slicing with character-aware parsing or validate that the `LongPollId` string contains only ASCII characters before slicing.
Workarounds
• Disable the RPC server by removing `rpc.listen_addr` from `zebrad.toml`.
• Ensure `enable_cookie_auth = true` (the default) and restrict filesystem access to the `.cookie` file.
• Place a reverse proxy in front of the RPC port that validates `LongPollId` parameters are ASCII-only before forwarding.
Impact
A single authenticated RPC request terminates the `zebrad` process. Same impact profile as GHSA-c8w6-x74f-vmg3: repeatable on restart, affects mining pools and infrastructure that forward `getblocktemplate` calls.
Credit
Reported by `@sangsoo-osec` via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-52731 ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-248 Uncaught Exception weakness