GitHub Advisoryadvisory · crates.io

GHSA-qv2r-v3mx-f4pf zebrad has full node denial of service via non-ASCII LongPollId in getblocktemplate

MEDIUM Published 2026-07-02 Modified 2026-07-02 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-52731
Ecosystem
crates.io
Packages
zebra-rpc, zebrad
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-248
Reviewed
2026-07-02

Affected packages

• crates.io zebra-rpc: < 8.0.0 → fixed in 8.0.0 • crates.io zebrad: < 4.5.0 → fixed in 4.5.0

Description

Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`. 2. Your `zebrad.toml` sets `rpc.listen_addr` to a TCP address (RPC server is enabled). 3. An attacker can authenticate to the RPC endpoint. With the default `enable_cookie_auth = true`, this requires the attacker to read the `.cookie` file. With `enable_cookie_auth = false`, any network client reaching the RPC port can trigger it. Summary The `getblocktemplate` RPC handler panics when parsing a `LongPollId` parameter that contains non-ASCII (multi-byte UTF-8) characters. The handler performs byte-index string slicing on the user-supplied string, which panics in Rust when a byte index falls within a multi-byte character boundary. Because Zebra's release profile sets `panic = "abort"`, the panic terminates the entire node process. Details The `getblocktemplate` handler receives a user-supplied `LongPollId` string and slices it at fixed byte offsets to extract the encoded tip hash and tip height. When the string contains multi-byte UTF-8 characters, a byte-index slice can land in the middle of a character, causing Rust's `str` indexing to panic with "byte index is not a char boundary." Under the `panic = "abort"` release profile, this panic terminates the entire `zebrad` process rather than just the RPC task. Patches zebra-rpc 8.0.0 and zebrad 4.5.0. Replace byte-index string slicing with character-aware parsing or validate that the `LongPollId` string contains only ASCII characters before slicing. Workarounds • Disable the RPC server by removing `rpc.listen_addr` from `zebrad.toml`. • Ensure `enable_cookie_auth = true` (the default) and restrict filesystem access to the `.cookie` file. • Place a reverse proxy in front of the RPC port that validates `LongPollId` parameters are ASCII-only before forwarding. Impact A single authenticated RPC request terminates the `zebrad` process. Same impact profile as GHSA-c8w6-x74f-vmg3: repeatable on restart, affects mining pools and infrastructure that forward `getblocktemplate` calls. Credit Reported by `@sangsoo-osec` via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-52731 ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-248 Uncaught Exception weakness

References