GHSA-qvfm-67h2-2qfx 9routers has Exposure of Sensitive Information and Unprotected Database Import/Export, Allowing Complete Credential Theft and Database Takeover

• npm 9router: <= 0.4.71 (no fix yet)

Summary The `/api/settings/database` endpoint allows full database export (containing all credentials, API keys, OAuth tokens, and settings) and full database import (complete overwrite) without any authentication requirement beyond the `ALWAYS_PROTECTED` middleware check, which only validates JWT or CLI token. Combined with other vulnerabilities (e.g., default password, tunnel exposure), this enables complete database takeover. Description The endpoint `/api/settings/database` is listed in `ALWAYS_PROTECTED` in `dashboardGuard.js` (line 42), which requires a valid JWT token or CLI token. However, this protection is insufficient because: 1. GET (Export): Returns the complete database including API keys (`key` field in `apiKeys` table), OAuth tokens, and all provider credentials. Line 80 in `src/lib/db/index.js`: `apiKeys: db.all("SELECT * FROM apiKeys").map(...)` — the `key` field contains the plaintext API key value. 2. POST (Import): Accepts arbitrary JSON and performs a complete database wipe-and-replace in a transaction (lines 102-163 in `src/lib/db/index.js`). This replaces all settings including the password hash, effectively allowing an attacker to set their own password. 3. The exported data includes `apiKeys` with their plaintext `key` values, `providerConnections` with all OAuth tokens, and `settings` with OIDC client secrets. Evidence File: `src/app/api/settings/database/route.js` ```javascript export async function GET() { const payload = await exportDb(); return NextResponse.json(payload); } export async function POST(request) { const payload = await request.json(); await importDb(payload); // ... } ``` File: `src/lib/db/index.js` (lines 96-163) ```javascript export async function importDb(payload) { db.transaction(() => { // Wipe all tables db.run(`DELETE FROM settings`); db.run(`DELETE FROM providerConnections`); db.run(`DELETE FROM providerNodes`); db.run(`DELETE FROM proxyPools`); db.run(`DELETE FROM apiKeys`); db.run(`DELETE FROM combos`); db.run(`DELETE FROM kv WHERE scope IN (...)`); // Then insert attacker-controlled data // ... }); } ``` The `exportDb` function at line 80 exposes API key plaintext: ```javascript apiKeys: db.all(`SELECT * FROM apiKeys`).map((r) => ({ id: r.id, key: r.key, name: r.name, ... })), ``` Steps to Reproduce 1. Authenticate with any valid JWT (e.g., using the default password "123456") 2. Export: `curl -b auth_token= http://localhost:20128/api/settings/database` 3. Observe: Full database dump with all credentials in plaintext 4. Import malicious data: `curl -X POST -b auth_token= -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '' http://localhost:20128/api/settings/database` 5. All settings, passwords, API keys are now replaced with attacker-controlled values Impact • Confidentiality: Complete exposure of all stored secrets (API keys, OAuth tokens, OIDC client secrets) • Integrity: Complete database replacement with attacker-controlled data • Availability: Database wipe is possible by importing an empty database • Scope Changed: Importing new settings affects all users and downstream services Recommended Fix 1. Require re-authentication for database export/import (not just an existing session) 2. Mask/redact API keys in export (or require explicit opt-in for key export) 3. Add confirmation step for import (require current password verification) 4. Implement database backup before import 5. Log all export/import operations with audit trail