GitHub Advisoryadvisory · NuGet
GHSA-rfx3-98h7-v3xp Marten's LINQ provider has SQL injection via unescaped string literals
CRITICAL
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-75513
- Ecosystem
- NuGet
- Packages
- Marten
- Severity
- Critical
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
- Weaknesses
- CWE-89
- Reviewed
- 2026-09-17
Affected packages
• NuGet Marten: >= 7.0.0, < 9.13.0 → fixed in 9.13.0
Description
Several code paths in Marten's LINQ provider and tenant-management internals interpolated a runtime, potentially attacker-influenced value into generated SQL as a single-quoted string literal without escaping or parameterization. A value containing a single quote (`'`) could break out of the literal and inject arbitrary SQL.
The primary vector is a `Dictionary` indexer key used in a `Where` filter — `Where(x => x.Attributes[key] == v)` — a common "filter by attribute name" / EAV pattern. It is confirmed with an executed proof-of-concept and yields filter / multi-tenant authorization bypass (returning other tenants' rows) and blind data exfiltration. Where the application permits `;`-batched statements (Npgsql default), data modification is also possible.
Affected sinks
• `Linq/Members/Dictionaries/DictionaryItemMember.cs` — dictionary indexer key (primary, confirmed PoC)
• `Linq/Members/Dictionaries/DictionaryContainsKeyFilter.cs` — `Dictionary.ContainsKey(key)` (Newtonsoft serializer only; System.Text.Json escapes the quote)
• `Linq/Parsing/SelectParser.cs` — a constant string projected through `Select(x => new { L = runtimeString })`
• `Internal/Operations/DeleteAllForTenant.cs` — tenant id reaching per-tenant projection teardown via `IEventStore.DeleteProjectionProgressAsync` (an in-code comment wrongly claimed the value was validated)
• `Schema/DatabaseScopedTenantPartitions.cs` — tenant id inlined into `FOR VALUES IN ('...')` partition DDL
• `Events/Daemon/Internals/EventLoader.cs` (defense-in-depth) — per-tenant partition-pruning literal
Proof of concept (primary vector)
Benign: `x.Attributes["nonexistent-key"] == "v"` returns 0 rows. Attack: `x.Attributes["nonexistent' = '' or 1=1 --"] == "v"` returns all rows. Generated SQL:
```
select d.data from public.mt_doc_doc as d where d.data -> 'Attributes' ->> 'x' or 1=1 --' = :p0;
```
Fix
Each sink now escapes embedded single quotes (`.Replace("'", "''")`, mirroring the existing `Ordering.BuildNgramRankExpression`) or binds the value as a parameter (`DeleteAllForTenant`). Where a literal is retained for partition pruning, escaping preserves plan-time pruning while closing the injection. Regression tests lock down each vector.
Workarounds
Until upgrading: do not pass untrusted input as a dictionary indexer key / `ContainsKey` argument / `Select` constant, nor as a tenant id into projection teardown or provisioning; and disable multi-statement command batching to limit blast radius.
Credit
Reported privately and responsibly by an external security researcher with an executed PoC. Additional sinks found during the follow-up LINQ-wide audit.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-75513 Marten is a .NET Transactional Document DB and Event Store on PostgreSQL. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command weakness
References
- https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/security/advisories/GHSA-rfx3-98h7-v3xp web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75513 advisory
- https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/pull/4911 web
- https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/commit/61882d0424854cb48703f08bdb246894ac576bed web
- https://github.com/JasperFx/marten package
- https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/releases/tag/9.13.0 web