GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go
GHSA-rg2x-37c3-w2rh Docker: Race condition in docker cp allows bind mount redirection to host path
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-42306
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Packages
- github.com/docker/docker, github.com/moby/moby/v2, github.com/moby/moby
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-367, CWE-61
- Reviewed
- 2026-05-18
Affected packages
• Go github.com/docker/docker: <= 28.5.2 (no fix yet)
• Go github.com/moby/moby/v2: < 2.0.0-beta.14 → fixed in 2.0.0-beta.14
• Go github.com/moby/moby: <= 28.5.2 (no fix yet)
Description
Summary
A race condition during `docker cp` mount setup allows a malicious container to redirect a bind mount target to an arbitrary host path, potentially overwriting host files or causing denial of service.
Details
When copying files into a container, the daemon sets up a temporary filesystem view by bind-mounting volumes into a private mount namespace. During this setup, the mount destination is created inside the container root and then a bind mount is attached using the container-relative path resolved to an absolute host path.
Between mountpoint creation and the `mount()` syscall, a process running inside the container can replace the destination (or a parent path component) with a symlink pointing to an arbitrary location on the host. The `mount()` syscall follows the symlink, causing the volume to be bind-mounted onto an arbitrary host path instead of the intended container path.
Impact
A malicious container can redirect a volume bind mount to an arbitrary host path. The impact depends on the volume content and mount options:
• If the volume is writable, arbitrary host files at the redirected path could be overwritten with the volume's contents.
• If the volume is read-only, the host path is masked by the mount for the duration of the operation, causing denial of service.
• In all cases the mount is temporary (torn down after the `docker cp` completes), but the effects of any writes persist.
Conditions for exploitation
• A container must have at least one volume mount.
• A process inside the container must be able to rapidly create and swap symlinks at the volume mount destination path.
• An operator must initiate a `docker cp` into that container, or call the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or `HEAD /containers/{id}/archive` API endpoints.
Not affected
• Containers that do not have volume mounts are not affected, as the race occurs during volume bind-mount setup.
Workarounds
• Only run containers from trusted images.
• Avoid using `docker cp` with untrusted running containers.
• Use authorization plugins to restrict access to the archive API endpoints (`PUT /containers/{id}/archive`, `HEAD /containers/{id}/archive`).
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-42306 Moby is an open source container framework. vulnerability