GHSA-rgjc-h3x7-9mwg Angular Client Hydration DOM Clobbering & Response-Cache Poisoning

• npm @angular/core: >= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.1 → fixed in 22.0.1 • npm @angular/core: >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.17 → fixed in 21.2.17 • npm @angular/core: >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.25 → fixed in 20.3.25 • npm @angular/core: <= 19.2.25 (no fix yet)

To optimize client-side bootstrap in Server-Side Rendered (SSR) environments, Angular supports Hydration via `provideClientHydration()`. During SSR, Angular serializes the application's runtime state (such as cached `HttpClient` responses) and outputs it into the HTML stream as a `` tag with a predictable identifier: ```html {"some-api-url": {"body": ...}} ```` During client bootstrap, Angular recovers this state by looking up the element via `document.getElementById('ng-state')` and parsing its text content. Because the DOM element lookup for the state container is predictable and relies solely on the ID selector (`ng-state`), it is susceptible to DOM Clobbering. If the application binds untrusted user input or CMS content to element properties such as `id` (e.g., `` or ``) *before* the genuine `` tag is parsed by the browser, the attacker-controlled element takes precedence in the DOM lookup. During hydration, when Angular calls `document.getElementById('ng-state')`, the browser returns the attacker's clobbered element. Angular then attempts to parse the text content or attributes of this clobbered element as JSON. Impact By clobbering the state element, the attacker can inject a custom JSON payload into Angular's `TransferState` cache. The most critical exploitation vector is poisoning the HTTP Transfer Cache. 1. The attacker injects a clobbered `ng-state` element containing custom JSON. 2. The JSON maps a key (representing a target API endpoint URL) to a malicious payload of the attacker's choice. 3. During client-side initialization, Angular's `HttpClient` checks `TransferState` before making requests. Finding the poisoned key, `HttpClient` returns the forged response instantly instead of requesting the genuine backend API. Depending on how the application processes and renders the affected API response, this can lead to: • DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if poisoned fields are rendered using unsafe bindings. • Privilege Escalation by spoofing user info or session details retrieved from poisoned API payloads. • UI Hijacking and redirection by spoofing configuration endpoints. Patched Versions • 22.0.1 • 21.2.17 • 20.3.25 Workarounds If you cannot immediately update to a patched Angular version, apply the following workarounds: A. Avoid Dynamic/User-Controlled IDs Avoid binding raw user-supplied values or dynamic CMS IDs directly to element attributes. If dynamic IDs are required, sanitize them or prepend a static safe prefix: ```html ... ... ``` B. Configure a Custom Application ID Declaring a unique, non-predictable `APP_ID` changes the ID suffix of the state element, making it harder for attackers to predict and target: ```ts // app.config.ts import { APP_ID } from '@angular/core'; import { provideClientHydration } from '@angular/platform-browser'; export const appConfig = { providers: [ { provide: APP_ID, useValue: 'unique-obfuscated-app-id' }, provideClientHydration() ] }; ``` This changes the state element lookup ID from `ng-state` to `unique-obfuscated-app-id-state`.