GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327 OpenChoreo: cluster-gateway internal proxy performs no caller authentication and is not read-only — data-plane Secret disclosure and arbitrary Kubernetes mutation

• Go github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo: < 1.0.3 → fixed in 1.0.3 • Go github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo: >= 1.1.0, < 1.1.3 → fixed in 1.1.3 • Go github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo: >= 1.2.0-rc.1, < 1.2.0 → fixed in 1.2.0

Summary The OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (`/api/proxy/`, `/api/exec/`, `/api/wirelogs/`) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as "read-only," the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can — with no client certificate or token — read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane. Impact An attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane's Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows: • Secret disclosure — reading any Secret outside `kube-system` in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions. • Workload tampering or destruction — creating, modifying, or deleting Deployments, Services, and other resources. • Pod command execution inside workload pods via `/api/exec/`. This is also the missing second authorization layer behind GHSA-52gf-6rpq-fgmx (the openchoreo-api exec/wirelogs cross-project authorization bypass): because the gateway provides no compensating authorization, that bypass — and any other authz gap or SSRF that reaches the internal API — reaches the data-plane Kubernetes API unchecked. Direct exploitability depends on the network isolation of the internal listener, which is not fixed in source. Where the internal port is reachable by untrusted workloads with no restrictive NetworkPolicy — and with impact landing in a separate data-plane cluster — this is Critical; it is scored conservatively as High otherwise. Patches Fixed in 1.0.3, 1.1.3, and 1.2.0. Upgrade path: 1.1.x → 1.1.2, 1.0.x and earlier → 1.0.2, 1.2.0-rc1 line → 1.2.0.