GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr Tekton Pipelines has VerificationPolicy regex pattern bypass via substring matching

• Go github.com/tektoncd/pipeline: >= 0.43.0, < 1.0.2 → fixed in 1.0.2 • Go github.com/tektoncd/pipeline: >= 1.2.0, < 1.3.4 → fixed in 1.3.4 • Go github.com/tektoncd/pipeline: >= 1.4.0, < 1.6.2 → fixed in 1.6.2 • Go github.com/tektoncd/pipeline: >= 1.7.0, < 1.9.3 → fixed in 1.9.3 • Go github.com/tektoncd/pipeline: >= 1.10.0, < 1.11.1 → fixed in 1.11.1

hey guys, triage contract this is a first-screen summary; deterministic proof is in the proof bundle (canonical.log/control.log/witness.txt). summary trusted resources verification policies match a resource source string (`refSource.URI`) against `spec.resources[].pattern` using `regexp.MatchString`. in go, `regexp.MatchString` reports a match if the pattern matches anywhere in the string, so common unanchored patterns (including examples in tekton documentation) can be bypassed by attacker-controlled source strings that contain the trusted pattern as a substring. this can cause an unintended policy match and change which verification mode/keys apply. pins • repo: https://github.com/tektoncd/pipeline • commit: 0133513db03dadb3cb08801d6b0330badcb63830 • callsite: pkg/trustedresources/verify.go:118-137 (getMatchedPolicies) severity MEDIUM (provisional CVSS 5.3–6.5) (signing request tampering) repro (canonical) • command: unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc && cd poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001 && make canonical • expected: cap not reached; canonical does not emit the vulnerability markers. • actual: cap reached; canonical emits the vulnerability markers. • canonical markers (mandatory): [CALLSITE\_HIT] + [PROOF\_MARKER] negative control • command: unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc && cd poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001 && make control • expected: cap not reached under the same harness; control emits the control marker and does not emit the vulnerability markers. • control markers (mandatory): [CALLSITE\_HIT] + [NC\_MARKER] fix consider making matching safe-by-default by requiring full-string matches (or validating patterns and documenting substring semantics clearly). one option is to anchor patterns before matching (e.g., wrap `pattern` as `^(?:pattern)$` when not already anchored), or to provide a separate field for exact match vs regex match. fix accepted when: under the same harness, canonical still hits [CALLSITE\_HIT] but does not emit [PROOF\_MARKER]. proof bundle pointers • bundle: poc.zip • bundle convention: zip extracts under a single top-level folder (poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/) to avoid collisions • contains: canonical.log, control.log, witness.txt • extracted paths: after extraction, see ./poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/canonical.log, ./poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/control.log, ./poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/witness.txt • verify: compare shasum -a 256 for canonical.log/control.log/fix.patch/test source against witness.txt • supported-mode note: if your supported integration uses verified https app-links/universal links only, provide the supported tag/branch and we can retest on that pin. poc.zip --- impact an attacker can craft a trusted resources source string that embeds a trusted substring and still matches an unanchored verificationpolicy `spec.resources[].pattern`, even if the policy is intended to constrain matches to a specific trusted source. this occurs because `regexp.MatchString` succeeds on substring matches, so patterns like `https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog.git` match attacker-controlled sources such as `https://evil.com/?x=https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog.git`. affected: deployments using trusted resources verification with unanchored verificationpolicy patterns, where an attacker can influence the `refSource.URI` value used for policy matching. not affected: deployments that anchor all patterns (`^...$`) or otherwise enforce full-string matching; deployments where attackers cannot influence `refSource.URI`. steps to reproduce ```bash unzip -q -o poc.zip -d /tmp/poc-tekton-regex-001 cd /tmp/poc-tekton-regex-001/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001 bash ./run.sh canonical | tee /tmp/tekton-regex-001-canonical.log bash ./run.sh control | tee /tmp/tekton-regex-001-control.log grep -n '\\[PROOF_MARKER\\]' /tmp/tekton-regex-001-canonical.log && grep -n '\\[NC_MARKER\\]' /tmp/tekton-regex-001-control.log && ! grep -n '\\[PROOF_MARKER\\]' /tmp/tekton-regex-001-control.log ``` suggested patch options: • make matching safe-by-default by anchoring patterns before matching (or by validating and rejecting unanchored patterns). • document the substring semantics explicitly and update documentation examples to include anchors. workarounds anchor verificationpolicy resource patterns so they must match the full source string. example: • `^https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog\\.git$` best, oleh