GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536 vLLM has SSRF Protection Bypass
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-25960
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- vllm
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
- Weaknesses
- CWE-918
- Reviewed
- 2026-03-09
Affected packages
• PyPI vllm: >= 0.15.1, < 0.17.0 → fixed in 0.17.0
Description
Summary
The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the `load_from_url_async` method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.
Affected Component
• File: `vllm/connections.py`
• Function: `load_from_url_async`
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The SSRF fix uses `urllib3.util.parse_url()` to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, `load_from_url_async` uses `aiohttp` for making the actual HTTP requests, and `aiohttp` internally uses the `yarl` library for URL parsing.
These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (`\`) differently:
| Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior |
|--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| `urllib3.parse_url()` | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `httpbin.org` | `/%[email protected]/` | URL-encodes `\` as `%5C`, treats `\@evil.com/` as part of the path |
| `yarl` (via aiohttp) | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `evil.com` | `/` | Treats `\` as part of userinfo (`user: httpbin.org\`), the `@` acts as the userinfo/host separator |
Attack Scenario
```python
Attacker provides this URL
malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/"
1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url)
parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url)
parsed.host == "httpbin.org" ✅ Passes validation
2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
async with session.get(malicious_url) as response:
# Request actually goes to evil.com! ❌ Bypass!
```
Why This Happens
1. yarl: Interprets `httpbin.org\` as the userinfo component, and `@` as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as `user=httpbin.org\`, `host=evil.com`, `path=/`
2. urllib3: URL-encodes the backslash as `%5C`, so `\@evil.com/` becomes `/%[email protected]/` which is treated as part of the path, leaving `host=httpbin.org`
This inconsistency allows an attacker to:
• Bypass the hostname allowlist check
• Access arbitrary internal/external services
• Perform full SSRF attacks
Fixes
• https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-25960 vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery weakness
References
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc web
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536 web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25960 advisory
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743 web
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/6f3b2047abd4a748e3db4a68543f8221358002c0 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977 web
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25960 web
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2445892 web
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536 advisory
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-3411.yaml web
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm package
- https://pypi.org/project/vllm web
- https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-25960.json web