GHSA-v467-g7g7-hhfh AVideo has SSRF in Scheduler Plugin via callbackURL Missing `isSSRFSafeURL()` Validation

• Packagist wwbn/avideo: < 26.0 → fixed in 26.0

Summary The Scheduler plugin's `run()` function in `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php` calls `url_get_contents()` with an admin-configurable `callbackURL` that is validated only by `isValidURL()` (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through `isSSRFSafeURL()`, which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network `callbackURL` to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet. Details The vulnerable code is at `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php:157-166`: ```php // Line 157: callback URL retrieved and site-root token substituted $callBackURL = $e->getCallbackURL(); $callBackURL = str_replace('$SITE_ROOT_TOKEN', $global['webSiteRootURL'], $callBackURL); if (!isValidURL($callBackURL)) { return false; } // isValidURL() only checks URL format via filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL) // The critical missing check is: // if (!isSSRFSafeURL($callBackURL)) { return false; } if (empty($_executeSchelude[$callBackURL])) { $_executeSchelude[$callBackURL] = url_get_contents($callBackURL, '', 30); ``` `isValidURL()` in `objects/functions.php` uses `filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)` — it validates URL syntax only and does not block internal/private network targets. `isSSRFSafeURL()` in `objects/functions.php:4021` explicitly blocks: • `127.x.x.x` / `::1` (loopback) • `10.x.x.x`, `172.16-31.x.x`, `192.168.x.x` (RFC-1918 private) • `169.254.x.x` (link-local, including AWS/GCP metadata at `169.254.169.254`) • IPv6 private ranges This function was added to the LiveLinks proxy (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw fix, commit `0e5638292`) and was previously used in the aVideoEncoder download flow (GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), but the Scheduler plugin was not updated in either fix wave, leaving it as an incomplete patch. An admin can configure the `callbackURL` for a scheduled task via the Scheduler plugin UI and trigger execution immediately via the "Run now" interface. PoC ```bash Step 1: Authenticate as admin Step 2: Create a scheduled task with cloud metadata SSRF callback curl -b "admin_session=" -X POST \ https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/add.json.php \ -d "callbackURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&status=a&type=&date_to_execute=2026-03-18+12:00:00" Step 3: Trigger immediate execution via Scheduler run endpoint curl -b "admin_session=" \ https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/run.php Step 4: Read the scheduler execution logs curl -b "admin_session=" \ https://target.avideo.site/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/get.json.php Response includes the AWS metadata API response with IAM role credentials ``` Expected: Internal network addresses rejected before HTTP request is made. Actual: The server makes an HTTP request to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` and the response (including AWS IAM role credentials) is stored in the scheduler execution log. Impact • Cloud credential theft: On AWS, GCP, or Azure deployments, the attacker can retrieve IAM instance role credentials from the cloud metadata service (`169.254.169.254`), potentially enabling privilege escalation within the cloud environment. • Internal service probing: The attacker can make the server issue requests to internal APIs, microservices, or databases with HTTP interfaces not exposed to the internet. • Incomplete patch amplification: The fix for GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw and GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6 added `isSSRFSafeURL()` to specific call sites but not the Scheduler. Deployments that updated expecting comprehensive SSRF protection remain vulnerable via this path. • Blast radius: Requires admin access. Impact is significant in cloud-hosted deployments where instance metadata credentials unlock broader infrastructure access. Recommended Fix Add `isSSRFSafeURL()` validation to the Scheduler callback URL before `url_get_contents()` is called, consistent with the existing SSRF fixes in `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` and `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`: ```php $callBackURL = $e->getCallbackURL(); if (!isValidURL($callBackURL)) { return false; } // Add this SSRF check — same pattern as LiveLinks proxy fix (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw): if (!isSSRFSafeURL($callBackURL)) { _error_log("Scheduler::run SSRF protection blocked callbackURL: " . $callBackURL); return false; } if (empty($_executeSchelude[$callBackURL])) { $_executeSchelude[$callBackURL] = url_get_contents($callBackURL, '', 30); ```