GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go
GHSA-v479-vf79-mg83 Vikunja: Scoped API tokens with projects.background permission can delete project backgrounds
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-40103
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Packages
- code.vikunja.io/api
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
- Weaknesses
- CWE-836, CWE-863
- Reviewed
- 2026-04-10
Affected packages
• Go code.vikunja.io/api: < 2.3.0 → fixed in 2.3.0
Description
Summary
Vikunja's scoped API token enforcement for custom project background routes is method-confused. A token with only `projects.background` can successfully delete a project background, while a token with only `projects.background_delete` is rejected.
This is a scoped-token authorization bypass.
Details
I verified this locally on commit `c5450fb55f5192508638cbb3a6956438452a712e`.
Relevant code paths:
• `pkg/models/api_routes.go`
• `pkg/routes/routes.go`
• `pkg/modules/background/handler/background.go`
Route registration exposes separate permissions for the same path:
• `GET /api/v1/projects/:project/background` -> `projects.background`
• `DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/background` -> `projects.background_delete`
At enforcement time, `CanDoAPIRoute()` falls back to the parent group and reconstructs the child permission from the path segments only. For the DELETE request, that becomes `background`, so the matcher accepts any token containing `projects.background` without re-checking the HTTP method or matching the stored route detail.
This matters because `RemoveProjectBackground()` is a real destructive operation:
• It checks project update rights.
• It deletes the background file if present.
• It clears the project's `BackgroundFileID`.
PoC
1. Log in as a user who can update a project that already has a background.
2. Create an API token with only:
`{"projects":["background"]}`
3. Send:
`DELETE /api/v1/projects//background`
`Authorization: Bearer `
4. Observe that the request succeeds and the project background is removed.
For comparison:
1. Create an API token with only:
`{"projects":["background_delete"]}`
2. Repeat the same DELETE request.
3. Observe that the request is rejected with `401 Unauthorized`.
I confirmed this locally with three validations:
1. `/api/v1/routes` advertises both `background` and `background_delete`.
2. The matcher unit test proves `CanDoAPIRoute()` accepts DELETE for `background`.
3. The webtest proves a real API token with only `background` successfully deletes the background.
Impact
Scoped API tokens can exceed their intended capability. A token intended for project background access can delete project backgrounds, which weakens the trust model for automation and third-party integrations that rely on narrowly scoped tokens.
The attacker needs a valid API token created by a user who has update rights on the target project, but the token itself only needs the weaker `projects.background` permission.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-40103 Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-v479-vf79-mg83 web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40103 advisory
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/2584 web
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/6a0f39b252a81fa4b19dc56dc889183acc9225ae web
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja package
- https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.3.0 web