GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go

GHSA-v479-vf79-mg83 Vikunja: Scoped API tokens with projects.background permission can delete project backgrounds

MEDIUM Published 2026-04-10 Modified 2026-04-24 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-40103
Ecosystem
Go
Packages
code.vikunja.io/api
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Weaknesses
CWE-836, CWE-863
Reviewed
2026-04-10

Affected packages

• Go code.vikunja.io/api: < 2.3.0 → fixed in 2.3.0

Description

Summary Vikunja's scoped API token enforcement for custom project background routes is method-confused. A token with only `projects.background` can successfully delete a project background, while a token with only `projects.background_delete` is rejected. This is a scoped-token authorization bypass. Details I verified this locally on commit `c5450fb55f5192508638cbb3a6956438452a712e`. Relevant code paths: • `pkg/models/api_routes.go` • `pkg/routes/routes.go` • `pkg/modules/background/handler/background.go` Route registration exposes separate permissions for the same path: • `GET /api/v1/projects/:project/background` -> `projects.background` • `DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/background` -> `projects.background_delete` At enforcement time, `CanDoAPIRoute()` falls back to the parent group and reconstructs the child permission from the path segments only. For the DELETE request, that becomes `background`, so the matcher accepts any token containing `projects.background` without re-checking the HTTP method or matching the stored route detail. This matters because `RemoveProjectBackground()` is a real destructive operation: • It checks project update rights. • It deletes the background file if present. • It clears the project's `BackgroundFileID`. PoC 1. Log in as a user who can update a project that already has a background. 2. Create an API token with only: `{"projects":["background"]}` 3. Send: `DELETE /api/v1/projects//background` `Authorization: Bearer ` 4. Observe that the request succeeds and the project background is removed. For comparison: 1. Create an API token with only: `{"projects":["background_delete"]}` 2. Repeat the same DELETE request. 3. Observe that the request is rejected with `401 Unauthorized`. I confirmed this locally with three validations: 1. `/api/v1/routes` advertises both `background` and `background_delete`. 2. The matcher unit test proves `CanDoAPIRoute()` accepts DELETE for `background`. 3. The webtest proves a real API token with only `background` successfully deletes the background. Impact Scoped API tokens can exceed their intended capability. A token intended for project background access can delete project backgrounds, which weakens the trust model for automation and third-party integrations that rely on narrowly scoped tokens. The attacker needs a valid API token created by a user who has update rights on the target project, but the token itself only needs the weaker `projects.background` permission.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-40103 Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-836 Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication weakness
  • CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization weakness

References