GHSA-v9pg-7xvm-68hf python-multipart: Negative Content-Length in parse_form buffers the entire body in memory

• PyPI python-multipart: < 0.0.31 → fixed in 0.0.31

Summary `parse_form()` did not validate the `Content-Length` header before using it to bound its chunked read of the request body. A negative `Content-Length` turned the bounded read into a read-until-EOF, so the entire body was loaded into memory in a single read instead of in fixed-size chunks. Details `parse_form()` reads the input stream in chunks, never reading more than the remaining `Content-Length` at a time. The per-chunk size is computed as `min(content_length - bytes_read, chunk_size)`. The header value was parsed to an integer without checking its sign, so a `Content-Length` of `-1` made this expression negative, and `input_stream.read(-1)` reads until end of stream. The intended bounded, chunked read therefore collapsed into a single unbounded read of the whole stream. The amount read is still bounded by what the client actually sends. Impact This only affects code that calls `parse_form()` directly with a `Content-Length` header taken from attacker-controlled input and without normalizing a negative value first. No known package is affected: • Starlette and FastAPI drive `MultipartParser` directly from the ASGI `receive()` stream and do not call `parse_form()`. • Known `parse_form()` consumers either do not forward `Content-Length` to it, recompute it from the already-read body, or run behind a layer (such as Werkzeug) that normalizes a negative `Content-Length` to `0`. The realistic exposure is limited to bespoke WSGI or `http.server` handlers that forward raw client headers into `parse_form()`. In that case a crafted request buffers the body in memory at once, degrading availability under concurrent requests rather than causing a complete denial of service. Mitigation Upgrade to version `0.0.31` or later, which rejects a negative `Content-Length` with a `ValueError` before reading the stream.