GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Hex

GHSA-vj8p-hp9x-gh47 mpp vulnerable to Gas Draining with low gas limit

HIGH Published 2026-09-25 Modified 2026-09-25 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
Hex
Packages
mpp
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weaknesses
CWE-20
Reviewed
2026-09-25

Affected packages

• Hex mpp: >= 0.2.0, < 0.6.0 → fixed in 0.6.0

Description

Vulnerability When the server acts as the fee payer, `mpp` Elixir 0.4.0 (ZenHive/mpp) does not validate whether the `gas_limit` set by the client is enough before broadcasting. A malicious client can drain the server's gas without paying. A `transferWithMemo` call on Tempo Moderato testnet requires ~51,299 gas to complete successfully. By setting `gas_limit = 51,298`: 1. The Tx gets cosigned and broadcast by the server. 2. The Tx runs out of gas during EVM execution. All state reverts. 3. The server's fee-payer wallet is charged for gas used. 4. The client pays nothing and receives no resource. ```bash Run the PoC unzip mpp_elixir_low_gas_PoC.zip cd mpp_elixir_low_gas_PoC docker build -t mpp-elixir-low-gas . docker run --rm mpp-elixir-low-gas ``` Zero-Cost DoS Attack: Unlike gas draining with `access list` or `padding`, where the malicious client needs to complete a payment to drain the gas, this vulnerability allows malicious users to continuously drain the server's gas at virtually no financial cost (requiring only computing power). Therefore, an attacker can spawn *N* malicious clients to completely drain the funds from the server's wallet to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Once the server's wallet is empty, it has no more funds to pay the gas fees for upcoming requests from legitimate clients. ```bash Run the DoS PoC unzip mpp_elixir_low_gas_dos_PoC.zip cd mpp_elixir_low_gas_dos_PoC docker build -t mpp-elixir-dos . docker run --rm mpp-elixir-dos ``` Vulnerable code path: `broadcast_and_verify/7` in `mpp/methods/tempo.ex` (ZenHive/mpp 0.4.0). When `wait_for_confirmation = true` (the default), it calls `rpc_broadcast_sync` directly without any gas-adequacy check or simulation. The alternative `wait_for_confirmation = false` path does call `simulate_payment_call` via `eth_call`, but that simulation omits the `gas` parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions. Impact A malicious client can drain the server's wallet without any financial cost.

Related

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-20 Improper Input Validation weakness

References