GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Hex
GHSA-vj8p-hp9x-gh47 mpp vulnerable to Gas Draining with low gas limit
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- Hex
- Packages
- mpp
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-20
- Reviewed
- 2026-09-25
Affected packages
• Hex mpp: >= 0.2.0, < 0.6.0 → fixed in 0.6.0
Description
Vulnerability
When the server acts as the fee payer, `mpp` Elixir 0.4.0 (ZenHive/mpp) does not validate whether the `gas_limit` set by the client is enough before broadcasting. A malicious client can drain the server's gas without paying.
A `transferWithMemo` call on Tempo Moderato testnet requires ~51,299 gas to complete successfully. By setting `gas_limit = 51,298`:
1. The Tx gets cosigned and broadcast by the server.
2. The Tx runs out of gas during EVM execution. All state reverts.
3. The server's fee-payer wallet is charged for gas used.
4. The client pays nothing and receives no resource.
```bash
Run the PoC
unzip mpp_elixir_low_gas_PoC.zip
cd mpp_elixir_low_gas_PoC
docker build -t mpp-elixir-low-gas .
docker run --rm mpp-elixir-low-gas
```
Zero-Cost DoS Attack: Unlike gas draining with `access list` or `padding`, where the malicious client needs to complete a payment to drain the gas, this vulnerability allows malicious users to continuously drain the server's gas at virtually no financial cost (requiring only computing power). Therefore, an attacker can spawn *N* malicious clients to completely drain the funds from the server's wallet to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Once the server's wallet is empty, it has no more funds to pay the gas fees for upcoming requests from legitimate clients.
```bash
Run the DoS PoC
unzip mpp_elixir_low_gas_dos_PoC.zip
cd mpp_elixir_low_gas_dos_PoC
docker build -t mpp-elixir-dos .
docker run --rm mpp-elixir-dos
```
Vulnerable code path: `broadcast_and_verify/7` in `mpp/methods/tempo.ex` (ZenHive/mpp 0.4.0).
When `wait_for_confirmation = true` (the default), it calls `rpc_broadcast_sync` directly without any gas-adequacy check or simulation. The alternative `wait_for_confirmation = false` path does call `simulate_payment_call` via `eth_call`, but that simulation omits the `gas` parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.
Impact
A malicious client can drain the server's wallet without any financial cost.
Related
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-20 Improper Input Validation weakness