GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g Signal K Server's WebSocket Login Endpoint Lacks Rate Limiting (Credential Brute-Force)
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-41893
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- signalk-server
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-307
- Reviewed
- 2026-05-04
Affected packages
• npm signalk-server: < 2.25.0 → fixed in 2.25.0
Description
Summary
The HTTP login endpoints (`POST /login` and `POST /signalk/v1/auth/login`) are protected by `express-rate-limit` (default: 100 attempts per 10-minute window, configurable via `HTTP_RATE_LIMITS`). The WebSocket login path — sending `{login: {username, password}}` messages over an established WebSocket connection — calls `app.securityStrategy.login()` directly without any rate limiting.
An attacker can bypass HTTP rate limiting entirely by opening a WebSocket connection and attempting unlimited password guesses at the speed bcrypt allows (~20 attempts/sec with 10 salt rounds).
Details
Vulnerable code: `src/interfaces/ws.ts`, function `processLoginRequest` (lines 753-780)
The function directly calls `app.securityStrategy.login(msg.login.username, msg.login.password)` with no throttling or attempt tracking.
Rate-limited HTTP path for comparison: `src/tokensecurity.ts` lines 609-617 apply `loginLimiter` middleware to the HTTP login routes at line 637.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Start Signal K server with security enabled
2. Open a WebSocket connection to `ws://server:3000/signalk/v1/stream?subscribe=none`
3. Wait for the hello message
4. Send login attempts in rapid succession:
```json
{"requestId": "1", "login": {"username": "admin", "password": "guess1"}}
{"requestId": "2", "login": {"username": "admin", "password": "guess2"}}
```
5. Observe that all attempts are processed without any 429 response or throttling
6. For comparison, send 100+ HTTP POST requests to `/signalk/v1/auth/login` — the 101st returns 429
A POC script is available that demonstrates both the HTTP rate limiting working correctly and the WebSocket path accepting unlimited attempts.
Impact
• Credential brute-forcing via the WebSocket protocol at ~20 attempts/sec (bcrypt-limited)
• Complete bypass of the HTTP rate limiting defense
• A single WebSocket connection is sufficient for unlimited attempts
• With multiple parallel connections, throughput multiplies
• A 10,000-word dictionary attack completes in ~8 minutes over a single connection
Signal K servers are commonly deployed on boat networks where they may be accessible to other devices on the same LAN.
CWE
CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
Suggested Fix
Track failed login attempts per remote IP in a shared store (or reuse the existing express-rate-limit store) that is checked in both the HTTP login middleware and the processLoginRequest WebSocket handler.
Context
Found while building an open source maritime security scanner. Verified on v2.24.0 (current master).
Discovered by Mark Curphey
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-41893 Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-307 Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts weakness
References
- https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41893 advisory
- https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/pull/2568 web
- https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/215d81eb700d5419c3396a0fbf23f2e246dfac2d web
- https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server package
- https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.25.0 web