GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g Signal K Server's WebSocket Login Endpoint Lacks Rate Limiting (Credential Brute-Force)

HIGH Published 2026-05-04 Modified 2026-05-13 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-41893
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
signalk-server
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weaknesses
CWE-307
Reviewed
2026-05-04

Affected packages

• npm signalk-server: < 2.25.0 → fixed in 2.25.0

Description

Summary The HTTP login endpoints (`POST /login` and `POST /signalk/v1/auth/login`) are protected by `express-rate-limit` (default: 100 attempts per 10-minute window, configurable via `HTTP_RATE_LIMITS`). The WebSocket login path — sending `{login: {username, password}}` messages over an established WebSocket connection — calls `app.securityStrategy.login()` directly without any rate limiting. An attacker can bypass HTTP rate limiting entirely by opening a WebSocket connection and attempting unlimited password guesses at the speed bcrypt allows (~20 attempts/sec with 10 salt rounds). Details Vulnerable code: `src/interfaces/ws.ts`, function `processLoginRequest` (lines 753-780) The function directly calls `app.securityStrategy.login(msg.login.username, msg.login.password)` with no throttling or attempt tracking. Rate-limited HTTP path for comparison: `src/tokensecurity.ts` lines 609-617 apply `loginLimiter` middleware to the HTTP login routes at line 637. Steps to Reproduce 1. Start Signal K server with security enabled 2. Open a WebSocket connection to `ws://server:3000/signalk/v1/stream?subscribe=none` 3. Wait for the hello message 4. Send login attempts in rapid succession: ```json {"requestId": "1", "login": {"username": "admin", "password": "guess1"}} {"requestId": "2", "login": {"username": "admin", "password": "guess2"}} ``` 5. Observe that all attempts are processed without any 429 response or throttling 6. For comparison, send 100+ HTTP POST requests to `/signalk/v1/auth/login` — the 101st returns 429 A POC script is available that demonstrates both the HTTP rate limiting working correctly and the WebSocket path accepting unlimited attempts. Impact • Credential brute-forcing via the WebSocket protocol at ~20 attempts/sec (bcrypt-limited) • Complete bypass of the HTTP rate limiting defense • A single WebSocket connection is sufficient for unlimited attempts • With multiple parallel connections, throughput multiplies • A 10,000-word dictionary attack completes in ~8 minutes over a single connection Signal K servers are commonly deployed on boat networks where they may be accessible to other devices on the same LAN. CWE CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts Suggested Fix Track failed login attempts per remote IP in a shared store (or reuse the existing express-rate-limit store) that is checked in both the HTTP login middleware and the processLoginRequest WebSocket handler. Context Found while building an open source maritime security scanner. Verified on v2.24.0 (current master). Discovered by Mark Curphey

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-41893 Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-307 Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts weakness

References