GHSA-vp2x-qp44-57v7 NLTK: Quadratic CPU Exhaustion in `XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()`

• PyPI nltk: < 3.10.3 → fixed in 3.10.3

Summary `XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()` reads a corpus file in 1 KiB blocks, appending each block to a growing `fragment` string, then calls `_VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment)` on the full accumulated buffer every iteration. Because each iteration rescans the entire accumulated fragment, the total amount of work grows quadratically with input size. Commit `c9c332284` (CWE-1333) made each `match()` call linear. The quadratic behavior is separate: the loop calls `match()` once per 1 KiB block, each time on a longer buffer. On the test system, an 8 MiB malformed XML file consumed approximately 48 CPU-seconds through the public `BNCCorpusReader.words()` API with no source modification. Absolute timings vary by hardware. `_read_xml_fragment()` imposes no limit on fragment size or iteration count. Details File: `nltk/corpus/reader/xmldocs.py` Function: `XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()`, lines 261–308 The relevant loop: ```python fragment = "" while True: fragment += stream.read(self._BLOCK_SIZE) # grows by 1 KiB per iteration if self._VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment): # rescans full buffer each time return fragment ... last_open_bracket = fragment.rfind(" 0: # False for single-' 0` is `False`, so the backtrack branch is never taken. • The only exit is EOF, after all N bytes are consumed. Affected readers -> readers that rely on `XMLCorpusView`, including `BNCCorpusReader`, `NPSChatCorpusReader`, `SemcorCorpusReader`, `MTECorpusReader`, `NKJPCorpusReader`, `FrameNetCorpusReader`, `VerbNetCorpusReader`, and direct `XMLCorpusView` instantiation. `XMLCorpusReader.xml()` is not affected -> it calls `defusedxml.safe_parse()`. PoC Requires only `pip install nltk`. No corpus data needed. ```python from pathlib import Path from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory from time import perf_counter from nltk.corpus.reader.bnc import BNCCorpusReader SIZES_KIB = (256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192) results = [] with TemporaryDirectory() as directory: root = Path(directory) malformed = root / "unterminated.xml" for kib in SIZES_KIB: malformed.write_bytes(b"<" + b"a" * (kib * 1024 - 1)) t = perf_counter() try: list(BNCCorpusReader(str(root), [malformed.name]).words()) except ValueError as e: assert "tag not closed" in str(e) results.append(perf_counter() - t) print("KiB seconds growth") for i, (kib, elapsed) in enumerate(zip(SIZES_KIB, results)): ratio = "-" if i == 0 else f"{elapsed / results[i-1]:.2f}x" print(f"{kib:5d} {elapsed:9.3f} {ratio}") ``` Runtime should increase by approximately fourfold for each doubling of input size, although absolute timings vary by hardware. During verification, `_VALID_XML_RE.match()` was instrumented to record the size of each input. For a 256 KiB malformed file it was invoked 257 times on monotonically increasing buffers (1024, 2048, …, 262144 bytes), with the final call occurring after EOF. This confirms that every iteration rescans the accumulated fragment. Impact Applications that process attacker-controlled XML corpus files through an affected reader are vulnerable. The attacker needs only write access to a path the reader will open. No NLTK credentials or special privileges required. Offline tools reading only trusted local corpora are not at risk. Affected versions: Verified in NLTK 3.9.4, 3.10.0, and the current develop branch. Historical inspection indicates the same loop structure has existed since the introduction of `XMLCorpusView` (2007), but only the listed versions were experimentally verified. No patch exists in any published release. This issue results in CPU exhaustion and may allow denial of service in applications that process attacker-controlled XML corpus files. Suggested Fix Avoid rescanning the accumulated fragment from the beginning after each 1 KiB read. Incremental parsing, bounded fragment accumulation, or another streaming approach would eliminate the quadratic behavior while preserving existing semantics. A regression test should verify that `BNCCorpusReader.words()` raises `ValueError` within a fixed timeout (e.g. 5 seconds) against a 2 MiB malformed input. The existing `test_xmldocs_security.py` covers only the prior ReDoS payloads and does not exercise this path.