GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-82393
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- pnpm
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-22, CWE-73, CWE-94
- Reviewed
- 2026-09-02
Affected packages
• npm pnpm: < 10.34.5 → fixed in 10.34.5
• npm pnpm: >= 11.0.0, < 11.11.0 → fixed in 11.11.0
Description
Summary
When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved manifest `name` as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose `package.json` `name` is a scoped path traversal (`@x/../../…/`) is therefore extracted outside `node_modules`, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can overwrite existing files there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → code execution (e.g. `~/.zshrc`, `.git/hooks/pre-commit`, another package's code). Occurs during `pnpm install` even with `--ignore-scripts` (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.
Same class as the just-patched GHSA-hwx4 (transitive-dependency *alias* traversal) and GHSA-v23m (`stage download` manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved name.
Root cause
• The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw `path.join(modules, )` in `installing/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706`, `installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614`, and `deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233` — without the `safeJoinModulesDir` guard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (`installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222`). The store location is `node_modules/.pnpm//node_modules/`, so a traversal `` escapes.
• The only resolve-time name gate (`resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753`) rejects only *unscoped* names containing `/`, so a scoped `@x/../..` passes.
Steps to reproduce
Self-contained PoC (real `[email protected]`; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):
```
npm i [email protected]
host a tarball whose package.json name = "@x/"+"../".repeat(25)+"/OUTSIDE"; victim depends on the http URL
pnpm install --ignore-scripts
```
Confirmed output (`repro/poc.mjs`, exit 0):
```
escape dir is outside the project : true
new file implanted outside node_modules : true
pre-existing file OVERWRITTEN : true
• CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote & overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` *
```
Remediation
Route the isolated-linker import-target joins (`resolvePeers.ts:706`, `deps-resolver/index.ts:614`, `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233`) through `safeJoinModulesDir` (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce `validate-npm-package-name` on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at `pickPackage.ts:753`) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-82393 pnpm is a package manager. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82393 advisory
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12872 web
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12890 web
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/51300fd41c5e4c8f47635108e373cc3d1f324fa7 web
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/78e29fe5583a1e5d69ea05e414eff310f78d5ed9 web
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm package
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.34.5 web
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v11.11.0 web