GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-w2vw-w76x-qr89 Nx: OS command injection via git revisions and remote refs
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- nx
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-78, CWE-88
- Reviewed
- 2026-10-05
Affected packages
• npm nx: >= 14.0.0, < 22.7.8 → fixed in 22.7.8
• npm nx: >= 23.0.0, < 23.1.1 → fixed in 23.1.1
Description
Summary
Nx core builds several `git` invocations as shell command strings with untrusted values interpolated into them, so a value that should be a git revision or ref is parsed by `/bin/sh` instead. Two entry points are reachable by an attacker: `affected` commands, where `defaultBase` / `affected.defaultBase` from `nx.json` (and the `NX_BASE` / `NX_HEAD` environment variables) reach `git merge-base` and `git diff`; and `nx import`, where a branch name advertised by a remote repository reaches `git fetch`, `git checkout`, and `git config`. In both cases an attacker who controls a repository — or who opens a pull request against one — gets arbitrary command execution on the machine of anyone who runs an ordinary Nx command against it, including CI runners.
The `affected` path is the more serious of the two. `nx affected` and `nx show projects --affected` run constantly in CI, so a pull request that changes nothing but `nx.json` is enough to execute code on the runner with whatever credentials that job holds.
Severity
Exploitable by anyone who controls repository content — a fork's pull request, or a repository the victim clones — that the victim then runs an ordinary `nx affected` or `nx import` against; no access to the victim's machine is required. We have no evidence of exploitation in the wild.
Affected & Patched Versions
| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `nx` | `>= 14.0.0, = 23.0.0, :` the same way. Because a shell parses the whole line, a revision value containing shell syntax is executed rather than passed to `git`.
The revisions are wrapped in double quotes, which looks protective but is not: POSIX shells still perform command substitution inside double quotes, so a value of `$(…)` runs without needing to break out of the quotes.
`nx import`
The `GitRepository` helper runs every git operation — `fetch`, `checkout`, `reset`, `config`, and others — by interpolating its arguments into a shell command string. The untrusted argument is a branch name: `nx import` lists the branches a remote advertises, offers them to the user to choose from, and feeds the chosen name back into those commands. A hostile repository controls the names of its own branches, so it controls the command that runs when one is selected.
Credits
• Arkadiusz Marta (RE:SOURCE) — Reporter
Related
References
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/security/advisories/GHSA-w2vw-w76x-qr89 web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/36348 web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/36379 web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/11ab38573478172109bb5306cb30ca4af246caf0 web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/4159295a037fdbd8e7f44a33a19d85ab3792415b web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/9ce184a04d2098a4797c8b0d6877ee079b751abf web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/c12850ce7b364db08e325c13541641d754db7123 web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/cd9b3c068e17adc9c1722b35b9ca962b98542c20 web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/cf996496bbad727362d48292b50fafc8c3665847 web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx package
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/22.7.8 web
- https://github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/23.1.1 web