GHSA-w4c6-7r69-w7j9 klever-go: REST API slow-header connection exhaustion via Gin Engine.Run

• Go github.com/klever-io/klever-go: >= 1.7.14, < 1.7.18 → fixed in 1.7.18

Summary The Klever seednode REST API starts a Gin engine with `Engine.Run(restAPIInterface)`. In Gin v1.9.1, `Engine.Run` calls Go's default `http.ListenAndServe`, which constructs an HTTP server without application-level `ReadHeaderTimeout`, `ReadTimeout`, or `MaxHeaderBytes` limits. An unauthenticated client that can reach a REST listener bound with Klever's documented `--rest-api-interface :8080` all-interface option can hold incomplete HTTP headers open indefinitely. In a local proof against the real `cmd/seednode/api.Start` path on `v1.7.17`, 120 slow-header connections caused 20/20 legitimate `/log` probes to fail with `accept: too many open files`. A fixed control using the same Gin router behind an explicit `http.Server` with `ReadHeaderTimeout`, `ReadTimeout`, and `MaxHeaderBytes` retained 0 slow connections and served 20/20 probes. This report is distinct from the P2P advisories and from my direct-message goroutine report. This finding concerns Klever-owned HTTP REST startup code (`cmd/seednode/api` and `network/api`) using Gin `Engine.Run` without server-level header deadlines. It does not depend on `MultiDataInterceptor`, `Batch.Decompress`, libp2p, malformed P2P messages, or direct-message goroutine spawning. Details Seednode REST API, latest release `v1.7.17`: • `cmd/seednode/api/api.go:17` defines `Start(restAPIInterface, marshalizer)`. • `cmd/seednode/api/api.go:18` creates `ws := gin.Default()`. • `cmd/seednode/api/api.go:23` returns `ws.Run(restAPIInterface)`. • `cmd/seednode/CLI.md:23` documents `--rest-api-interface`; it says `:8080` binds all interfaces and `off` disables the API. Node REST API, latest release `v1.7.17`: • `network/api/api.go:79` creates `ws = gin.Default()`. • `network/api/api.go:98` returns `ws.Run(kleverFacade.RestAPIInterface())`. • `cmd/node/main.go:147-150` documents the same `--rest-api-interface` flag and says `:8080` binds all interfaces. • `docker/README.md:56-61` and `docker/README.md:67-70` publish host port `8080` for full-node and validator Docker examples. • `README.md:264-268` documents that the node exposes a REST API for blockchain queries and operations. The seednode REST API source is byte-identical across `v1.7.14` through `v1.7.17`; the captured runtime PoC was executed on `v1.7.17`. Current `develop` commit `10bcfd50` remains affected: • `network/api/api.go:98` still returns `ws.Run(kleverFacade.RestAPIInterface())`. • `cmd/seednode/api/api.go:59` still returns `ws.Run(restAPIInterface)`. Gin v1.9.1 implements `Engine.Run` as: ```go func (engine *Engine) Run(addr ...string) (err error) { address := resolveAddress(addr) err = http.ListenAndServe(address, engine.Handler()) return } ``` In my source sweep, I did not find a production `http.Server{ReadHeaderTimeout: ...}` wrapper for either REST start path. The only `ReadHeaderTimeout` hit I found in the repository was a test helper under `network/api/websocket/routes_test.go`. PoC GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting does not appear to allow file attachments in this form, so I am including the reproduction command and captured output inline. I can paste the full 254-line Go test patch in a reply immediately if useful. The test starts two local child servers: 1. Vulnerable: the real `cmd/seednode/api.Start` path. 2. Fixed control: the same Gin router served through `http.Server{ReadHeaderTimeout: 250ms, ReadTimeout: 250ms, MaxHeaderBytes: 4096}`. Reproduction from a clean checkout: ```bash git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go cd klever-go git checkout v1.7.17 Apply the PoC patch to cmd/seednode/api. I can provide the full patch in this advisory thread. go test ./cmd/seednode/api -run TestPoC_SeednodeAPISlowlorisDifferential -count=1 -v -timeout 60s ``` Captured output on `v1.7.17`: ```text POC_RESULT mode=vulnerable slow_connections_opened=120 slow_connections_still_open=111 legitimate_probe_ok=0 legitimate_probe_fail=20 POC_RESULT mode=fixed slow_connections_opened=120 slow_connections_still_open=0 legitimate_probe_ok=20 legitimate_probe_fail=0 ``` The vulnerable server also logs repeated accept failures: ```text http: Accept error: accept tcp 127.0.0.1:56415: accept: too many open files; retrying in 1s ``` Impact For an externally reachable Klever REST listener, a single unauthenticated client can retain many server-side connections by never completing HTTP headers. Because the Go server has no read-header deadline, those connections persist until the client closes them or an external proxy/firewall intervenes. The direct result is REST API unavailability for legitimate clients. The local proof demonstrates this as 0/20 legitimate `/log` probes succeeding while the vulnerable server is saturated, versus 20/20 succeeding with the fixed server wrapper. I am not claiming default public internet exposure. The default bind is `localhost:8080`. The affected condition is a REST API listener exposed through Klever's documented all-interface bind or Docker port-publish deployment shape. This maps to the `SECURITY.md` High category: "Denial of Service affecting network availability." If Klever treats externally reachable REST API unavailability as non-critical because the default bind is localhost, the conservative classification is Medium under "Performance degradation attacks" / "Non-critical DoS vectors." All testing was local loopback only. I did not contact Klever mainnet, public testnet, hosted RPCs, explorers, or third-party production infrastructure. Suggested fix: Start both REST APIs through explicit `http.Server` values instead of `Engine.Run`, for example: ```go srv := &http.Server{ Addr: restAPIInterface, Handler: ws.Handler(), ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Second, WriteTimeout: 30 * time.Second, IdleTimeout: 120 * time.Second, MaxHeaderBytes: 32 << 10, } return srv.ListenAndServe() ``` Apply the same pattern to: • `cmd/seednode/api.Start` • `network/api.Start` If Klever expects deployments to expose the REST API through a reverse proxy, I still recommend setting server-level limits in the application. That keeps the binary safe when operators use the documented direct bind or Docker port-publish path.