GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45 Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration

• PyPI langflow: >= 1.1.2, < 1.10.3 → fixed in 1.10.3 • PyPI langflow-base: >= 0.1.2, < 0.10.3 → fixed in 0.10.3 • PyPI lfx: < 1.10.3 → fixed in 1.10.3

Summary Before Langflow 1.10.3, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever `command` / `args` a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in `bash -c "exec {command} ..."`. Any user able to reach the MCP server settings ("Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server", `POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}`) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a "server" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (`touch`, `rm -rf`, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start. With the default `LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true`, `GET /api/v1/auto_login` hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. `AUTO_LOGIN` is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it. The issue was fixed in two steps and is fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3 (and 1.11.0+): • 1.9.0 — #12290 added a command allowlist and argument/env validation to the REST model (`MCPServerConfig`), blocking the "Add MCP Server" vector reported here. • 1.10.3 — #14036 applied the same policy at the execution sink (`lfx.base.mcp.util`), including configs embedded in flows / tweaks and the final pre-spawn boundary, and removed the `bash -c` wrapper (the process is now exec'd directly, without a shell). Affected versions | Package (PyPI) | Vulnerable | Patched | |---|---|---| | `langflow` | `>= 1.1.2, = 0.1.2, &2"], env=env_data, ) ``` `command_str` is built from the user's `command` + `args`. The only "validation" before 1.9.0 was `_validate_node_installation`, which only checks that Node.js is installed when the command contains `npx`. The MCP SDK then starts the process with `anyio.open_process`, so the command runs before any MCP handshake — which is why it executes even if the UI shows "failed to start". PoC (as reported, Langflow 1.5.0 – 1.8.x) In "Add MCP Server" → STDIO, add: ``` Name - Test Command - touch Arguments - /tmp/pwn ``` Or through the API, using a token from `auto_login` (default configuration): ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -s http://127.0.0.1:7860/api/v1/auto_login | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["access_token"])') curl -s -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:7860/api/v2/mcp/servers/testing' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data-raw '{"command":"touch","args":["/tmp/pwned_langflow"]}' ``` `/tmp/pwned_langflow` gets created on the server. On 1.10.3+ the request is rejected with `Command 'touch' is not allowed for security reasons. Allowed commands: bash, cmd, docker, node, npx, python, python3, uvx`, and the same payload fails at the sink (`MCPStdioClient.connect_to_server("touch /tmp/pwned_langflow")` raises `MCPStdioSecurityError`, and no file is created). Wrappers such as `bash -c "touch ..."`, `sh -c ...`, `python3 -c ...` and `node -e ...` are also rejected. Fix • #12290 (1.9.0) — `MCPServerConfig` validators: command allowlist (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `npx`, `uvx`, `docker`, and `cmd`/`sh`/`bash` only to wrap one of those), shell-metacharacter and dangerous-keyword checks on arguments, env var blocklist (`LD_PRELOAD`, `NODE_OPTIONS`, `PYTHONPATH`, `BASH_ENV`, ...), and Docker isolation checks. • #14036 (1.10.3) — moves the policy into `lfx.base.mcp.security.validate_mcp_stdio_config` and enforces it at every entry point (API, embedded flow / tweak configs, the deprecated MCP Stdio component and just before spawn); it also launches the process without a shell: ```python command_parts = shlex.split(command_str) command, args = command_parts[0], command_parts[1:] validate_mcp_stdio_config(command, args, env) # final pre-spawn enforcement server_params = StdioServerParameters(command=command, args=final_args, env=env_data) ``` Later hardening (1.11.0, #13530) adds optional stricter modes for multi-tenant deployments. Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade) • Set `LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=false` and do not expose Langflow directly to untrusted networks. • Only give Langflow accounts to trusted users. Hardening recommendations for 1.10.3+ The allowlist still lets `npx` / `uvx` run any package by default, which is how MCP servers are normally distributed. On multi-tenant deployments, operators should also set: • `LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_ALLOWED_PACKAGES` — the exact packages `npx` / `uvx` may run. • `LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_INTERPRETER_HARDENING=true` and `LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_DOCKER_HARDENING=true`. • On 1.11.1+ (#14150), restricting custom code (`LANGFLOW_ALLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENTS=false`, `LANGFLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENT_ADMIN_ONLY=true` or `LANGFLOW_BLOCK_CODE_INTERPRETER_COMPONENTS=true`) also limits MCP stdio servers to superusers. Impact Remote code execution on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user (CWE-78). Any exposed instance on a vulnerable version is affected, whether the attacker has an account or uses the default `AUTO_LOGIN`. The reporter found several internet-facing Langflow servers that were vulnerable.